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In recent decades, a wide strand of literature has investigated the determinants of inward foreign direct 
investment, or FDI, and has acknowledged the role played by domestic institutions in either attracting or 
discouraging multinational firms’ investing decisions. In the meantime, a growing number of studies 
have addressed a complementary issue, that is whether increasing amounts of inward FDI have an effect 
on some institution of the host country. As a matter of fact, it is very likely that the relationship between 
FDI and domestic institutions is mutual, and the studies that mainly focus on either the influence of 
institutions on FDI, or on the effect of FDI on institutions, should properly account for that.  
My Ph.D. thesis aims to further investigate this subject, namely, the relationship between inward FDI 
and institutions, and is organized in three chapters. 
The first chapter, “Inward FDI and domestic institutions: an overview”, has an introductory character: 
first, it shortly introduces one of the most recognized approaches to multinational firms’ investing 
decisions, the OLI paradigm, and draws the attention to the increasingly acknowledged relevance of 
domestic institutions in affecting MNEs’ investing decisions. Then, it reviews the literature concerning 
both the directions of the relationship between FDI and institutions, which are often addressed separately, 
and also briefly illustrates to two interesting case studies. In doing so, the present work attempts to 
summarize the current state of the art concerning the relationship between FDI and institutions and, in 
particular, to identify the aspects which have been under-researched so far. From the analysis of the 
literature, it emerged that the existing studies on the impact of institutions on inward FDI mainly concern 
formal institutions. Moreover, the research focusing on the other direction (from FDI to institutions) is 
still relatively scant, and the existing empirical works examine one institutional factor or policy at a time, 
use a relatively small sample of countries, and/or on a narrow time frame. These two considerations 
represent the starting point and the rationale of the second and the third chapter of this thesis, respectively.  
The second chapter, “How do informal institutions influence inward FDI? A systematic review” 
(published in June 2018 on “Economia Politica – Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics”, 
DOI: 10.1007/s40888-018-0119-1), focuses on the less explored type of institutions, namely on 
informal institutions, and on their influence on foreign firms’ investing decisions. More specifically, the 
main aims of this work are to shed more light on this elusive concept - informal institutions - by drawing 
comparisons with related constructs, to overview the main types of informal institutions and their effects 
on FDI inflows, and to explore the heterogeneity across empirical studies focused on this issue using a 
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meta-regression analysis. The main findings are the following: according to most of the existing 
literature, informal institutions, such as trust, social networks and corruption, matter for attracting FDI; 
the sign is significantly determined by the type of informal institution considered. In particular, social 
networks and values typically favouring FDI, such as trust and attitude towards liberalism, have a 
significant and positive impact on inward FDI, and this especially holds when the host country is a 
developing economy. To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first meta-analysis to be conducted 
on this issue. 
The third chapter, “Does inward FDI affect the quality of domestic institutions? A cross-country panel 
analysis” (with Roberto Antonietti) aims to provide a more global picture on the effects of inward FDI 
on the institutional quality of the host country. More specifically, it aims to understand whether, beyond 
pursuing their own interests, MNEs may exert a positive influence on the host country and if so, which 
institutional dimensions are more affected, and to assess whether inward FDI can foster institutional 
change in transition and developing economies. To this purpose, it analyses the impact of FDI on the 
overall quality of the host country’s institutions, thus not limiting to some specific type, and then also on 
its main dimensions; it also resorts to a large sample and a considerable time frame, and adopts different 
econometric techniques, including fixed effects and dynamic system GMM in order to account for 
unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity. The main finding is that attracting FDI has a positive impact 
on the average quality of domestic institutions. In particular, this effect is stronger when institutions are 
measured in terms of political stability, regulatory quality and rule of law, when FDI is measured as the 
number of greenfield projects, and when the recipient country is a developing country and, to a lesser 
extent, a transition economy. 
The main contribution of this Ph.D. thesis is twofold. The first is to deeply analyse the informal 
institutions, which have been less explored than the formal ones, and their effect on inward FDI. The 
second is to estimate whether, and to what extent, increasing amounts of inward FDI do affect the quality 
of institutions in the host country.  In doing so, this work should contribute to both the literature on the 
institutional determinants of inward FDI and the literature on the institutional effects of FDI, and should 










In recent decades, a wide literature has included domestic institutions in the analysis of the determinants of inward 
FDI. However, it seems that also the latter are able to influence some institutional aspects of the host country. The 
main aim of this work is to provide a short overview of the mutual relationship between inward FDI and local 
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1.1 Introduction   
In the last 30 years, the world has become more and more interconnected and the geographical distances 
between its different continents and countries have been ideally reduced and redrawn along with the 
mutual strengthening of the economic and social connections, as well as the advances in technology and 
transportation and in the liberalization processes.   
In this interdependent and dynamic context, the scaffolding of international business has been deeply 
modified and shaped by the extraordinary globalization of production, which has been based not only on 
the export of raw materials and manufactured products, but also on the organization of production outside 
the national borders. In this scenario, the economic magnitude of the multinational firms has rapidly 
increased. As an illustration, in 1983 the incomes achieved by the biggest 200 multinational corporations 
were the equivalent of 25% of the global GDP while, in 2005, they amounted to 29.3% of the world GDP 
(UNCTAD, 2006). The main measure of the activity of these companies is represented by their Foreign 
Direct Investment, or FDI. According to the OECD, a foreign direct investment is an investment in a 
foreign company where the investor owns at least 10% of the ordinary shares, undertaken with the 
objective of establishing a “lasting interest” in the host country, a long-term relationship and a significant 
influence on the management of the firm (OECD, 2008). 
While the world has become increasingly globalized and the economic geography of FDI has been 
redrawn with the emerging of new, fast-growing economies (as an illustration, China in 2017 was the 
second biggest recipient of FDI inflows and the third largest countries in terms of FDI inflows 
[UNCTAD, 2018]), a vast strand of literature in international economics and international business has 
investigated relevant aspects related to FDI, including its main effects on the local economy and its main 
determinants, among which the institutional aspects of the host country received have gained importance 
especially during the last two decades.  
The main purpose of this work is to provide a simple but comprehensive and updated overview of the 
relationship between inward FDI and domestic institutions, which may represent a useful starting point 
for readers interested in delving into this topic and which also provides some guidelines for future 
research.  
The balance of this paper is organized as follows: section 1.2 illustrates the OLI paradigm and introduces 
the institutional approach; section 1.3 highlights the relevance of formal and also of informal institutions 
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for foreign investors’ decisions; section 1.4 addresses the issue of the influence of inward FDI on the 
host country’s institutions, which has been gaining increasing attention but is still under-researched; 
section 1.5 reviews the main datasets on FDI and institutions that can be used for conducting cross-
country panel analysis; finally, section 1.6 concludes.  
 
1.2 The OLI paradigm and the institutional approach  
One of the most adopted frameworks aimed at understanding the factors that induce a firm to become a 
multinational, proposed by John Dunning, is the eclectic or OLI paradigm. According to this approach, 
the extent, geography and industrial composition of the foreign production undertaken by multinational 
enterprises (or MNEs) is determined by the interaction of three sets of interdependent variables. The first 
one is the set of enterprises’ ownership-specific advantages (O): ceteris paribus, the greater these 
advantages of the investing firms, with respect to those of other firms, the more they are likely to engage 
in, or increase, their foreign production. These O-advantages include asset advantages, concerning the 
resource structure of the firm (e.g. product innovations, production management, innovatory capacity, 
ability to reduce transaction costs), and transaction cost-minimizing advantages, which derive from the 
capability of the firm to coordinate multiple and geographically dispersed value-added activities and to 
capture the gains from risk diversification (e.g. exclusive or favoured access to inputs, ability to conclude 
productive and cooperative inter-firm relationships, exclusive or facilitated access to product markets, 
better knowledge about international markets). The second variable consists of the locational attractions 
(L) of alternative countries or regions in which the multinational companies can undertake their activities: 
if they manage to combine their own competitive advantages with locational advantages, namely they 
find it more profitable to acquire the endowments they need in a foreign country, they will probably start 
or increase their FDI in that country. Examples of locational-specific factors are spatial distribution and 
availability of resource endowments and markets, cost, quality and productivity of the factor of 
productions, market size, transport and communication costs, infrastructure, and the economic, legal and 
regulatory system. Finally, according to the third component of the OLI paradigm, namely internalization 
(I), the greater the net benefits of internalizing cross-border intermediate product markets, the more likely 
a firm will prefer to engage in foreign production, rather than license the right to do so to a foreign firm. 
These internalization advantages  allow the multinational company to circumvent or exploit market 
failures, for instance to avoid search and negotiating costs, to avoid costs of moral hazard and adverse 
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selection, to avoid or exploit government intervention, to control market outlets (Dunning, 1988a; 
Dunning, 2000; Dunning & Lundan, 2008a).  
Dunning has revisited his OLI paradigm over time in order to take into account the changes in the 
organization and external environment of MNEs, such as the spread of cooperative relationships and 
networks, the clustering of high value-added activities, the increasing importance of relational assets of 
firms and countries in economic activities, and the growing acknowledge of the role of institutions in 
affecting the society and several economic outcomes (Dunning & Lundan, 2008a).  
Although it is possible to find some prior research on this topic (as an illustration, Basi [1963] 
investigated the effects of local political instability on FDI coming from the US), a milestone for the 
development of the so-called new institutional economics theory is represented by Douglass North’s 
work Institutional change: a framework analysis. Starting from the assumption that the Neoclassical 
economic theory is not sufficient to explain the account for the very diverse performance of societies and 
economies both at a moment of time and over time, North defines institutions as “the structure that 
humans impose on human interaction and therefore define the incentives that (together with the other 
constraints (budget, technology, etc.) determine the choices that individuals make that shape the 
performance of societies and economies over time”. (North, 1990, p.1). In another work published in 
1991, North proposes a shorter, compelling definition of institutions, namely “the humanly devised 
constraints that structure political, economic and social interactions” (North, 1991, p. 97). Another 
valuable definition has been provided more recently by Geoffrey M. Hodgson, who sees institutions as 
“the systems of established and embedded social rules that structure social interactions” (Hodgson, 
2006, p.13).  
This distinction between established and embedded social rules is closely connected to the distinction 
between formal and informal institutions. While formal institutions are founded on codified and explicit 
rules and standards that shape the interaction between members of society, and are created, 
communicated and enforced through channels that are widely accepted as official (North, 1990; Helmke 
& Levitsky, 2006), informal institutions consist in the “socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are 
created, communicated and enforced outside officially sanctioned channels, (Helmke & Levitsky, 2006, 
p.5). As an example, North (1990) mentions sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct.  
Formal institutions promote stability and regulation by providing authoritative behavioural guidelines, 
and by defining an established order within which individuals and firms operate (Scott, 2008a; Holmes 
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et al., 2013). They can be classified as regulatory (e.g. property rights, rule of law, and the judiciary 
system), political (e.g. political rights, political stability, democratic quality, and the presence of the 
military in politics), or economic (e.g. labour, business and financial freedoms [Kunčić, 2014]). With 
regard to informal institutions, they can either reinforce the formal rules (complementary informal 
institutions), or compensate for the weaknesses or inefficiency of formal institutions (substitutive 
informal institutions), or be in contrast with the formal framework (competing informal institutions 
[Helmke & Levitsky, 2006]). Three widely-acknowledged types of informal institution that emerge from 
the literature are trust towards other individuals, social networks -which can be defined as social ties 
developed through interpersonal and inter-organizational relationships between individuals or firms 
(Inkpen & Tsang, 2005) and which represents the main component of social-capital (Putnam et al., 1993), 
and corruption. In addition, cultural values and religiosity, despite some peculiarities, are often included 
in the realm of informal institutions.   
Dunning has acknowledged the relevance of North’s institutional prospective and has incorporated it in 
the three components of the OLI paradigm (see Dunning & Lundan, 2008b). In particular, he recognizes 
that the ownership-advantages component includes not only the asset and transaction-based advantages 
briefly illustrated before, but also advantages deriving from the institutional setting which is specific to 
a particular firm. This institutional infrastructure comprises a series of internally generated and externally 
imposed incentives, regulations and norms, which can be regarded as both formal or informal institutions, 
each of which may affect the managerial decision-taking, the attitudes and behaviour of the firm’s 
stakeholders. These institutional advantages influence the ways in which firms create new or utilise more 
effectively their existing resources, capabilities and markets. The incorporation of institutions in the 
locational advantages is quite intuitive and consists in paying more attention to the institutional aspects 
of a country that are appealing to foreign investors, such as strong rule of law, property rights protection, 
good quality of governance and democratic system. The way and the extent to which host-country 
institutions influence inward FDI has been extensively examined by the literature (see section 1.3). As 
for the I-advantages dimension, a number of studies have shown how the institutional framework of the 
host country matters for the MNEs decisions regarding the mode of entry and the form of their outward 
investment (e.g. Delios & Henisz, 2003; Meyer & Nguyen, 2005; Peng & Delios, 2006). Research has 
also examined the institutional influences inside the firm, coming from factors like imitation and the 




1.3. The role of institutions in attracting inward FDI: the literature  
In the last twenty-five years or so, a growing number of empirical studies aimed at investigating the 
domestic factors that matter for MNEs’ decisions have also taken into account institutional aspects, such 
as the quality of governance, the protection of property rights and the degree of economic freedom of the 
host country. 
In particular, growing attention has been given to institutional factors in the so-called transition 
economies of the Eurasia, which, starting from the beginning of the nineties, have experienced relevant 
processes of decentralization, modernization and democratization and, consequently, an increase in their 
institutional quality. The improvements in their economic, political and institutional conditions led to a 
rapid increase of inward FDI, which in turn boosted their transition process, their economic growth and 
industry reconstruction (Bevan & Estrin, 2004). In turn, the local governments often attempted to attract 
new foreign investment by undertaking processes of privatization, by introducing investment incentives 
(e.g. fiscal incentives, subsidized loans, loan guarantees, government insurance at preferential rates, 
subsidized dedicated infrastructure and services and protection form import competition [Dunning & 
Lundan, 2008a]), and by adhering to international treatments and regulations, including a series of anti-
corruption treaties  (such as the Criminal Law and the Civil law Convention on Corruption and, for the 
Eastern European countries which are OECD members, the OECD anti-bribery Convention [OECD, 
2016]).  
The increasing interest in the determinants of inward FDI in the transition economies has fuelled a vast 
empirical literature on this topic. As an illustration, Tintin (2013), who investigates the determinants of 
FDI in the transition economies over the period 1996-2009, finds that a high quality of domestic 
institutions, and especially a high degree of economic freedom, which particularly affects the business 
and investment environment, have a positive effect on inward FDI. Other institutional factors that are 
found to matter for firms investing in transition economies are, for instance, progress in structural reforms 
(mainly related to the privatization process and the banking sector), the lack of trade barriers, the 
individuals’ ability to accumulate private property, progress in fighting corruption in the host economy 
(Jimborean & Kelber, 2017) and, in particular in the Western Balkans, the restoration of peace and basic 
security (Kekić, 2005). With regard to the Balkan area, Demekas et al. (2007) assert that the initial wave 
of foreign investors was attracted primarily by market size, ease of access and low labour costs; however, 
once a “critical mass” of foreign investment was reached, the new investors were increasingly influenced 
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also by the degree of institutional development and the quality of the business environment of the 
country. Although, starting from the beginning of the new millennium, the Western Balkans underwent 
massive processes of political, economic and social transformation and reconstruction and attracted 
notable amounts of FDI, they still lag behind the other European transition countries. This is primarily 
due to the series of conflicts and political changes that happened from 1991 to 2001 (in particular the 
disintegration of the Yugoslav federation, five military conflicts, the international sanctions against the 
Former Yugoslavia, the Greek embargo related to the problems of recognition and denomination of the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Kosovo war and the NATO bombing of FR Yugoslavia in 
1999), which caused the break-up of the traditional economic and trade links, a very deep recession, 
delays in the economic reforms required for the transition to a market economy and in the integration of 
most countries with the rest of Europe (Demekas et al., 2007; Uvalić, 2012a).  
In order to obtain more robust and general conclusions about the role of transition-specific factors in 
influencing the FDI performance in the transition economies, Tokunaga & Iwasaki (2017) recently 
conducted a meta-analysis of 69 empirical studies investigating the determinants of inward FDI in this 
region.  Their main finding is that both exogenous features of the host-country, such as natural resource 
endowments and geographical locations, and endogenous policy-oriented efforts, such as market 
economy reforms and institutional integration with Western Europe, matter for foreign investors.  
Another valuable attempt to synthesize and review decades of research on the relationship between 
inward FDI and domestic institutional factors and which, unlike the work by Tokunaga & Iwasaki, does 
not focus on a specific sample of host countries, has been recently made by Bailey (2018), who conducted 
a meta-analysis based on 97 studies investigating the determinants of FDI. Bailey’s meta-analysis 
confirms that institutional factors such as political stability, democracy and rule of law attract FDI, while 
others such as corruption and tax rates deter it.  
Although they have not been so much explored as the formal ones so far, also informal institutions and 
their influence (direct or by means of their interaction with formal institutions) on inward FDI have been 
gaining increasing attention. As an illustration, some empirical studies show that a trust-based business 
environment favours inward FDI, since it reduces the probability of opportunistic behaviour in the local 
market, it facilitates the development of cooperative business relationships with local stakeholders, and 
it lowers monitoring costs. Similarly, sound social networks, which are based on trust, tend to foster FDI 
because they give foreign investors opportunities to have contacts in organizations with various 
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backgrounds and professions, and allow them to establish durable professional relationships (see, for 
instance, Wang, 2000; Lee & Filer, 2007; Seyoum, 2011; Zhao & Kim, 2011). Rather, the effect of 
corruption on multinational firms’ decisions is ambiguous: on the one hand, it damages the economy 
because it raises transaction costs for foreign investors (Bardhan, 1997), carrying the risk of a loss of 
reputation and brand goodwill (Zhao et al., 2003), and causing inefficiencies and market distortions by 
giving corrupt firms preferential access to lucrative markets (Habib & Zurawicki, 2002). On the other 
hand, corruption may help investors to circumvent long and inefficient bureaucratic procedures 
(Huntington, 1968), accelerate decision-making, and enable businesses to avoid onerous government 
regulations (Lui, 1985). Sometimes corruption may also help supplement low wages, enable governments 
to reduce taxes and partially compensate for weak regulatory systems, especially in developing countries 
(Tullock, 1996; Houston, 2007).  
Finally, it is worth mentioning that also the quality and the characteristics of the home country can affect 
the impact of domestic institutions on inward FDI. As a matter of fact, a number of studies resort to 
gravity models that use bilateral FDI between pairs of countries as dependent variables, and differences 
in relevant characteristics of the home and host country, including degree of development, location, 
culture and institutions as regressors (e.g. Du et al., 2012; Contractor et al., 2014; Kunčič & Jaklič, 2014; 
Demir & Hu, 2016). Recently, Cezar & Escobar (2015) proposed a theoretical model to explain the 
impact of institutional distance on FDI: according to their model, as adaptation costs increase with the 
institutional distance between source and host countries, the productivity threshold at which FDI is more 
profitable than exporting as a means of entering a foreign market increases and the number of firms that 
undertake FDI decreases. The assumptions of the model are confirmed by the author’s empirical analysis. 
However, the effect of institutional and cultural distance is ambiguous. Indeed, on the one hand it can 
raise transaction costs since it can prevent investing foreign firms from understanding host country 
players and establishing external legitimacy in host countries (Zaheer, 1995; Brouthers, 2013). In 
addition, different expectations between headquarter and subsidiaries erode internal communication and 
reduce the efficiency of information exchange and knowledge transfer (Gaur & Lu, 2007).  On the other 
hand, some authors (e.g. Boisot & Meyer, 2008; Cuervo-Cazurra & Ramamurti, 2015) assert that 
investors from countries characterized by a weak or inefficient institutional framework may strategically 





1.3.1 The importance of informal institutions for attracting FDI: the case of guanxi in China  
Before drawing the attention to what Kwok & Tadesse (2006, p.767) defined “the other side of the 
picture” in the relationship between inward FDI and institutions, it may be useful to shortly delve into 
an interesting case of well-established social network typical of China, known as guanxi. In the last thirty 
years, China has experienced a striking economic growth and a relevant transition process, and has 
become a new, prominent player within the international business community. At the same time, China 
has been receiving increasing volumes of FDI, in particular of the so-called non-Chinese FDI (namely 
FDI not coming from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, from which most of foreign investments came 
until the end of the eighties), to the point that, since the early nineties, it has become one of the top 
destinations of FDI in the world. (Wang, 2000; Lu, 2012).  However, its formal legal system, which is 
generally considered as an important determinant of FDI, is quite weak and inefficient and consequently, 
foreign investors face a great number of uncertainties in protecting their property rights, enforcing 
contracts, and settling investment-related disputes. According to several researchers, a key to understand 
the apparent contradiction between high amounts of inward FDI and high investment risk lies in the 
presence of strong informal networks in the Chinese society, known as guanxi, which act as substitutive 
informal institutions. Guanxi consists in a special type of social relations and connections based on 
mutual interests and benefits, in which relations between partners take place through reciprocal 
obligations, exchange of favors and continuous cooperation (Davies et al., 1995; Chen, 1995). The 
guiding principle of guanxi is mutual trust, which has been deeply rooted in the Chinese tradition for 
thousands of years. Guanxi are common also among business partners, who tend to create trustworthy 
and durable relationships (Wong & Leung, 2001), and also between entrepreneurs and government 
officials, since guanxi can help circumvent and overcome legal and administrative obstacles or serve as 
a mechanism to protect the company against unforeseen risks (Dunfee & Warren, 2001).  
Guanxi support not only Chinese people, but also foreign investors. Indeed, they complement official 
law by clarifying legal ambiguities and providing access to legal contract enforcement and dispute 
settlement mechanisms, and they secure potentially highly-profitable business opportunities by 
compensating for the high investment risks involved (Wang, 2000). In turn, since trust is considered a 
fundamental element also in business transactions, without which a formal contract is not stipulated 
(Ambler, 1995), foreign firms operating in China should commit to building trust-based and long-lasting 
relationships with the local policy makers and managers.  
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The relevance of guanxi also for China’s attractiveness in terms of FDI has been empirically tested 
mainly by means of interviews to local workers, local firms and foreign investors. As an illustration, Qiu 
(2005) administered a survey involving 105 foreign firms located in the Chinese province of Shaanxi; 
from the respondents’ answers it emerges that guanxi plays a prominent role in attracting firms especially 
in areas, such as Shaanxi, that are less competitive than other ones and are characterized by a poor formal 
institutional framework. Rather, Wang (2000) employs an econometric model which uses inward FDI in 
China as dependent variable and includes formal institutions among the regressors. Although he does not 
model them, he infers the relevance of trust and guanxi from the lack of significance of the institutional 
factors (typically affecting FDI) modelled.   
 
1.4 The impact of inward FDI on domestic institutions  
As I shortly illustrated in section 1.3, in recent decades, the literature in international economics and 
international business has largely explored the determinants of inward FDI and has acknowledged the 
relevance of host country’s institutions for the foreign investors’ decisions. However, although this issue 
is less explored than the one concerning the effect of institutions on FDI, an increasing number of studies 
have attempted to understand whether and to what extent inward FDI can affect some type of domestic 
institution and policy or the quality of governance of the domestic country. Indeed, on the one hand, 
foreign firms, which generally own a higher level of political power over public officials than non-
multinational, domestic firms, attempt to adapt to the local institutional condition and to obtain 
legitimacy in the local markets (Kostova, 1999; Dahan et al., 2006), and often try to also shape the local 
business environment in their favour (Boddewyn, 1988; Hillman & Hitt, 1999). To this purpose, they 
can resort, for instance, to lobbying activity, or adopt transfer-pricing schemes, or threaten the country 
to leave it if certain conditions are not satisfied (Desbordes & Vaudey, 2007). However, MNEs can also 
collaborate with local actors for the provision of public services, provide useful information about laws 
used in other destination countries or join policy networks, together with local policy makers, with the 
aim of proposing and implementing public policies (Dunning & Lundan, 2008a; Dahan et al., 2006). In 
addition, foreign firms may demonstrate to local firms how to conduct business in a different and often 
more advanced and efficient way, may promote the adoption of best practices and, by attracting young 
and talented workers (who often join business schools, training courses and take international 
certifications and, in doing so, they become more and more open-minded end reluctant towards obsolete 
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ways of doing business and conservative values ) may foster a process of modernization and institutional 
convergence with more liberal and advanced countries (Kwok & Tadesse, 2006). Thus, MNEs can also 
have a more indirect influence on the local society.  
 At the same time, the host countries that are sensitive to the benefits of inward FDI, and that commit to 
gaining legitimacy and international reputation within the bigger, global business community, voluntarily 
adopt policies aimed at attracting FDI (Martin & McKibbin, 1999; Kwok & Tadesse, 2006) or allow the 
foreign firms to intervene in their reform processes by working with local actors. This particularly holds 
for transition and developing economies, which are generally undertaking processes of modernization, 
catch-up and structural change, have more scope for institutional change than advanced countries, often 
have quite malleable formal institutions and where, especially in the case of Post-Communist countries, 
MNEs often do not settle for a passive role in their reform process (Malesky, 2009).  
As a matter of fact, in the last twenty years or so, several empirical studies have investigated the effect 
of increasing amounts of inward FDI on some institutions and policies. First, several researchers (e.g. 
(Kwok & Tadesse, 2006; Wei, 2000a, Sandholtz & Gray, 2003; Larrain B. & Tavares, 2004; Desbordes 
& Vauday, 2007; Robertson &Watson, 2004) have examined the effect of FDI on corruption. The latter 
can be positive because, for instance, MNEs can introduce more virtuous ways of doing business and are 
exposed to economic and political pressures from the international business community, and because 
corruption increases the costs and uncertainty of doing business. However, the prevailing effect can be 
also negative, since activities involving large infrastructure projects and rents, including FDI, are 
typically vulnerable to corruption and since the multinational companies themselves sometimes import 
in the host country sophisticated bribery schemes.  Moreover, as mentioned before, the literature has 
found inward FDI to exert an influence on some policies which matter for their activities, but also to 
improve the provision of public services, including training programs (see section 4.1). FDI also seems 
to boost processes of de-centralization, by means of the so-called “empowerment of local leaders effect” 
(Malesky, 2008), to favour the improvement of the political and economic relations between the home 
and the host country (by increasing their economic and political interdependence, which makes military 
conflicts more costly [Polacheck et al., 2012; Kahler & Kasttner, 2006; Kim, 2016]) and their institutional 
convergence (which can be fostered by the workers coming from the two countries who join the same 
multinational company[Kim, 2016; Lin, 2018).  For these reasons, some authors argued that foreign firms 
can act as “agents of change”, “agents of economic transition” or “institutional entrepreneurs” (Kwok & 
Tadesse, 2006; Malesky, 2008; DiMaggio, 1988).  
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1.4.1 MNEs as institutional entrepreneurs: the case of Vietnam  
A compelling example of fast-growing developing country of South-East Asia that attracted increasing 
amounts of inward FDI which, in turn, fostered its development and institutional change is offered by 
Vietnam. Since the beginning of economic reform in 1986 and the country’s subsequent reintegration 
with the global economy, FDI has been considered a strategic pillar of socio-economic development. 
Thus, the country introduced and implemented a series of investment-related rules and regulations, such 
as the Law of Foreign Investment in 1988 and 1996, and the Law of Investment in 2005 and 2014). It 
has been even argued that local governments resorted also to policies that are not permitted by central 
laws to attract foreign investors, such as some excessive incentives related to long tax holidays, free land 
rental and very low profits tax (Dung et al., 2018; Malesky, 2009). At the same time, the multinational 
firms located in Vietnam have increasingly demanded a workforce which is equipped with modern 
occupational qualifications and professional skills, but also soft skills such as team work, problem 
solving and critical thinking (Quang & Metzger, 2007). However, despite some improvements, the local 
vocational training does not fully fulfill the MNEs’ requirements, in particular because there is a limited 
communication between the business sector and vocational colleges, and because the latter typically do 
not have sufficient resources to update their equipment and provide further training for teachers 
(Hargreaves et al., 2001). As Dunning & Lundan (2008a) posit, in order to partially offset these limits, 
some MNEs decided to provide themselves the upgrading of human skills in the local environment.  
An interesting study on this subject has been conducted by Wrana & Diez (2016), who attempted to 
better understand whether MNEs in Vietnam can positively influence the quality of local education, 
mainly by introducing institutional elements of their home country’s skill formation system. Using a 
qualitative content analysis on 19 in-depth interviews with German and Japanese MNEs operating in 
Vietnam, as well as other stakeholders involved in the research project, the authors found out that MNEs, 
in cooperation with development agencies, are able to create proto-institutions that originate from their 
respective home country’s skill formation system. Although this study has an explorative character, it 
provides some useful insights on this interesting phenomenon. Moreover, Wrana et al. (2018) further 
investigated this issue with the use of econometric techniques and by employing a sample of more than 





1.5 Some widely-used datasets on FDI and institutions  
This section briefly reviews some widely-used cross-country panel datasets containing data on FDI and 
on institutional indicators.  
One of the most well-known databases used to collect data on FDI is the FDI Statistics dataset developed 
by UNCTAD. This dataset includes annual data on inward and outward FDI (provided in both their flow 
and stock version, in different measures and both in absolute and relative values, the latter with respect 
to GDP and other variables) at world level starting from 1970. It also reports some annex tables 
summarizing data that partially come also from other sources, such as the FDI Markets Database. The 
latter, launched by the Financial Time’s group, tracks the announced greenfield FDI projects, namely ex-
novo projects, in every country of the world, starting from 2003. Each project is registered together with 
information about the sector, the destination, the estimated job creation and capital investment.  Rather, 
the FDI Statistics dataset provides data on aggregate FDI stocks and flows which refer to both M&A and 
greenfield investments. While cross-border M&A just involve a simple change in ownership between 
firms, greenfield FDI are investment projects that entail the establishment of new assets and activities in 
the host country, and not simply a change in the ownership and control of a domestic company. 
(UNCTAD, 2009). Therefore, they may have a larger/additional impact on the domestic economic and 
institutional framework. Moreover, multinational companies typically prefer to undertake a greenfield 
FDI rather than a M&A in developing and transition economies because of a general lack of suitable 
domestic companies, and because in these areas the potential reverse flows of knowledge and technology 
from the host location to the country of origin are in general relatively low. This reduces the potential 
success of a M&A, which relies on significant bi-directional flows between the acquiring and acquired 
organizations. Rather, the creation of new greenfield establishments in developing and transition 
economies allow MNEs, in particular from advanced countries, to organize, configure and control all the 
aspects of the production or service process (Iammarino & McCann, 2013). For these reasons, it would 
be advisable, when possible, to distinguish between the two aforementioned types of FDI when its 
influence on the domestic institutional environment is investigated.  
As far as institutions are concerned, a highly acknowledged and widely employed dataset is the 
Worldwide Governance Indicator Database developed by Daniel Kaufmaan and Aart Kraay. This dataset 
includes six indicators capturing six complementary institutional dimensions of a country and ranging 
from from about -2.5 (the lowest quality) to +2.5 (the best quality), such as: voice and accountability, 
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which captures perceptions of the extent to which citizens are able to participate in the selection of their 
government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and free press and media; political 
stability and absence of violence/terrorism, which is related to perceptions of the likelihood that the 
government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including 
politically-motivated violence and terrorism; government effectiveness, capturing perceptions of the 
quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political 
pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s 
commitment to such policies; regulatory quality, concerning perceptions of the ability of the government 
to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development and market-oriented strategies; rule of law, which reflects perceptions of the extent to which 
agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract 
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence; 
control of corruption, capturing perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private 
gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and 
private interests (see Kaufmann et al., 2011). The WGI condense information from a wide set of 
perception-based governance data sources (e.g. the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness 
Report, the Institute for Management Development’s World Competitiveness Yearbook and the World 
Bank/EBRD’s Business Environment and Enterprise Performance surveys) and measure several relevant 
types of institution, such as civil liberties, political rights and freedom of press, property rights, rule of 
law and corruption. Annual data of the WGI, which are published by the World Bank Group, are available 
at world level on yearly basis starting from 1996. As an illustration, the country with the best regulatory 
quality in 2017 is Hong Kong (with a score of 2.16), followed by Singapore, New Zealand, Netherlands 
and Australia (World Bank Group, 2018).  
Another well-known indicator of institutional quality, which focuses especially on economic institutions, 
is the Index of Economic Freedom developed by the Heritage Foundation and available since 1995 for 
most of the world. This broad index, which ranges from 0 (lack of economic freedom) to 100 (full 
economic freedom) is based on 10 indicators, namely property rights, freedom from corruption, fiscal 
freedom, government spending, business freedom, labour freedom, monetary freedom, trade freedom, 
investment freedom and financial freedom. A country with an index lower than 50.0 is considered as 
repressed. A country with an index between 50.1 and 60.0 is mostly unfree, while it is defined as 
moderately free when it scores between 60.1 and 70.0. Finally, a country with an index higher than 70.0 
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is considered as mostly free. According to the Index of Economic Freedom 2018 Report, the most 
economically free country in 2017 is Hong Kong, followed by Singapore, New Zealand and Switzerland. 
Interestingly, also a country which is typically considered as a transition economy, namely Estonia, is in 
the top-ten, with an average index of 78.8 (mainly driven by the indicators of investment freedom and 
fiscal health [Heritage Foundation, 2018]).   
Researchers that need to collect data on informal institutions such as trust, social networks, cultural 
values and religiosity often resort to the World Value Survey (WVS), the European Value Survey (EVS) 
and/or the European Social Survey (ESS). These extensive datasets are based on large-scale, cross-
national and longitudinal surveys designed to empirically investigate the moral and social values and 
beliefs of the people living in the countries being surveyed. As for corruption, two widely-used measures, 
covering more than 150 countries, are the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) provided by Transparency 
International and the corruption index contained in the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). 
Another interesting data source is the Global Competitiveness Report on the economic and social 
performance of more than a hundred countries, released annually by the World Economic Forum. For 
each country scrutinized, this report provides a series of institutional indicators referring to both formal 
and informal institutions.   
 
1.6 Conclusions and suggestions for future research 
In the last twenty-five years or so, a broad literature aimed at investigating the phenomenon of FDI, 
which has rapidly spread and has relevant economic, political and social effects for the home and host 
country, but also for the increasingly globalized and interconnected global community, has flourished. 
This work mainly aims to shortly illustrate the mutual relationship between inward FDI and institutions, 
whose two directions are generally studied separately, mainly by reviewing the relevant literature and by 
presenting two interesting case studies. In doing so, it attempts to provide a simple but comprehensive 
picture of the current state of the art and to point out some research gaps.  
More specifically, although the role of domestic institutions in either attracting or discouraging foreign 
investors has been thoroughly and extensively investigated, to the point that some meta-analyses on 
empirical works devoted to this topic have been recently conducted, most of the existing studies focus 
on formal institutions. Actually, although in the last two decades a growing number of studies have 
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recognized the relevance of informal institutions as well in affecting relevant social and economic 
variables, including FDI, and of their interplay with formal institutions, this topic is still under-explored, 
the concept of informal institutions is rather elusive and the literature adopts different interpretations and 
classifications.  
Moreover, from the analysis of the literature on the effects of increasing amounts of inward FDI on some 
domestic institutions, it emerges that the existing empirical works focus on one institutional factor or 
policy at a time, on a relatively small sample of countries, and/or on a narrow time frame. Thus, it is 
difficult to draw more general and robust conclusions on this issue on the basis of this fragmented and 
heterogeneous framework.  
In the light of these considerations, future research should attempt to answer the following research 
questions: which elements can be considered as informal institutions and how they interact with similar 
constructs and with formal institutions? Which are the prevalent effects of informal institutions on inward 
FDI emerging from a systematic review of the existing empirical studies on this issue? Does inward FDI 
exert a positive effect on the quality of domestic institutions, especially in transition and/or developing 
economies?  
To conclude, although the relationship between FDI and domestic institutions has been largely 
investigated, the role of informal institutions in affecting foreign investors’ decisions and the 
effectiveness of formal institutions has been neglected  and, as far as “the other side of the picture” is 
concerned, there is still not a study which addresses the effect of inward FDI on a more comprehensive 
measure of the quality of domestic institutions and which resorts to a large sample of countries and to a 
considerable time frame. Therefore, future research should contribute to the existing literature by 
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Chapter 2.  How do informal institutions influence inward FDI? 




In the last fifteen years, the literature in international economics and international business has been paying 
increasing attention to informal institutions and to how they affect a variety of economic variables, inward FDI in 
particular. The main aims of this work are: to shed more light on a puzzling, elusive concept -informal institutions- 
also by drawing comparisons with related constructs; to overview the main types of informal institution and their 
effects on FDI inflows; to conduct a meta-analysis to explore the heterogeneity across empirical studies focused 
on the effects of informal institutions on FDI inflows. The main findings of the present work are as follows: 
according to most of the existing literature, informal institutions, such as trust, social networks and corruption, 
matter for the purpose of attracting FDI. The sign is significantly determined by the type of informal institution 
considered. In particular, social networks and values typically favouring FDI or in favour of it, such as trust and 
attitude towards liberalism, have a significant and positive impact on inward FDI, and this especially holds when 
the host country is a developing economy.  
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In recent decades, pervasive processes of modernization, globalization and technological progress have 
made the world economies increasingly dynamic and interconnected, and have fostered the development 
of multinational firms. One of the main measures of these companies’ activity is represented by foreign 
direct investments (FDI), defined by the OECD as investments in a foreign company in which the 
investor owns at least 10% of the ordinary shares, undertaken with the objective of establishing a “lasting 
interest” in the host country, a long-term relationship and a significant influence on the management of 
the firm (OECD, 2008).  
In the last twenty years, research in international business and international economics has been paying 
increasing attention to the effects of FDI on the host economies. For instance, domestic firms can benefit 
from the knowledge transfer deriving from the creation of links with foreign companies, and come into 
contact with different and sometimes more advanced technologies and managerial practices (Blomström 
& Kokko, 1998). FDI also foster competition, which motivates firms to innovate and become more 
productive (Blomström & Kokko, 1998; Spencer, 2008). On the other hand, this increased competition 
may lead to the exit of local businesses and to their gradual replacement, so FDI can have negative 
crowding-out effects too (Amoroso & Miller, 2017). Another strand of the literature has focused instead 
on host countries’ determinants of inward FDI. These include factors such as infrastructure, human 
capital, economic stability and production costs, which are associated with the location aspect of the OLI 
paradigm1, as well as market size, market growth, the economy’s openness, and factor endowments, 
which are mainly investigated by the so-called New Trade Theory (Assunção et al., 2013). Another group 
of FDI determinants, the relevance of which has been highlighted since the late nineties, reflects the 
quality and effectiveness of a country’s institutions. Growing awareness of the relevance of FDI, of 
institutions, and of their interaction clearly emerges from the sizable number of studies that deal with 
these topics. To give an example, as at June 2017 Scopus has indexed 488 papers belonging to the 
subareas Economics, Econometrics and Finance, Business, Management and Accounting and Social 
Sciences published between 1994 (the first year available) and 2016, with titles, abstracts and/or 
keywords containing both the terms “FDI” and “institutions”. Figure 2.1 shows the rising trend of the 
peer-reviewed works investigating these subjects. 
                                                          
1 Dunning’s eclectic paradigm (often referred to as the OLI paradigm) is one of the frameworks most often adopted to explain the factors 
that induce a firm to become a multinational. See Dunning (2000) for a review. 
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Most researchers analysing institutions have focused on the formal ones (e.g. property rights, rule of law, 
civil liberties and political stability), especially in the transition economies, which have changed 
dramatically over a short period of time. From this vast literature it emerged that, generally, formal 
institutions play a relevant role in affecting the multinationals’ investment decisions. In particular, 
increasing levels of institutional factors such as political stability, democracy, and rule of law tend to 
attract FDI, while others, such as corruption and poor governance, typically deter it. The results of these 
single studies are supported by the more robust and general findings of Bailey (2018), who conducted a 
meta-analysis based on a sample of 97 primary studies focusing on this issue.  
In the meantime, informal institutions, which are typically not codified, and are harder to observe and 
measure, have been attracting more attention, especially since the beginning of the twenty-first century. 
In particular, several empirical works have found a significant effect of informal institutions on inward 
FDI, and on other relevant economic variables. However, this topic is still little explored, especially with 
respect to the relationship between FDI and informal institutions. Moreover, the concept of informal 
institutions is rather elusive and the literature adopts different interpretations and classifications. The 
available studies on informal institutions are consequently very heterogeneous and generally focus on 
just one or a few types, making it difficult for the reader to gain a clear and satisfactory overview of this 
interesting but puzzling subject. 
 




Source: articles from the Scopus (Elsevier) database 
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 In the light of these considerations, the three main purposes that motivate this work are as follows: 
(i) to shed more light on a puzzling, elusive concept - informal institutions- also by drawing 
comparisons with related constructs (section 2.2);  
(ii) to overview the main types of informal institution and their effects on FDI inflows (section 2.2 
and section 2.3);  
(iii) to explore the heterogeneity across empirical studies focused on the effects of informal institutions 
on FDI inflows to see how, and to what extent, informal institutions affect a multinational firm’s 
decision to invest in a given country. This is done by means of a simple meta-analysis, which - to 
the best of the author’s knowledge – is the first to be conducted on this issue (sections from 2.3 to 
2.6). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2.2 contains an overview of the informal 
institutions framework, with a brief analysis of the main types forming the object of study; section 2.3 is 
devoted to a literature review of recent empirical studies on the influence of informal institutions on 
inward FDI; section 2.4 illustrates the empirical strategy and the data; section 2.5 presents and discusses 
the empirical findings; section 2.6 concludes.  
 
2.2 Informal institutions: an overview 
The present section provides a brief overview of informal institutions, mainly aiming to: shed light on 
the relationships and differences between formal and informal institutions; briefly describe what are 
typically considered as informal institutions, namely trust, social networks, corruption, but also culture 
and religion, which are often included in analyses on informal institutions, albeit with some peculiarities; 
underscore the main effects of these factors on inward FDI; reduce potential confusion on these topics 
by pointing out partial overlaps between similar concepts (such as informal institutions and social 
capital), and situations where the same item is included in different classifications. For instance, 
corruption is sometimes analysed from the point of view of governments monitoring and combatting the 
phenomenon and of the quality of governance, in which case it is included among the formal institutions. 
In addition, trust is considered an informal institution, as well as a major component of social capital, 
and sometimes as a cultural value too. This section also briefly presents the main datasets used by 
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researchers to obtain their indices of informal institutions, and provides the interested reader with 
numerous useful references on these aspects.   
 
2.2.1 Formal versus informal institutions 
Efforts to empirically analyse the effects of institutions on social and economic variables are quite a 
recent phenomenon, but anthropologists, sociologists and political scientists have long been interested in 
the role of institutions in various aspects of social life (such as the structure of family and kinship, social 
classes and government systems), and their effects on the structure and behaviour of organizations (Scott, 
2010). 
One of the most important contributions on the development of a modern institutional theory came from 
Douglass North, who defines institutions as “the humanly devised constraints that structure political, 
economic and social interactions” (North, 1991, p. 97). Another valuable definition was provided more 
recently by Geoffrey M. Hodgson, who sees institutions as “systems of established and embedded social 
rules that structure social interactions” (Hodgson, 2006, p.13). Theoretical support for the distinction 
between established and embedded social rules, which is closely connected to the distinction between 
formal and informal institutions, dates back to the beginning of the previous century. In his treatise 
Folkways. A Study of the Sociological Importance of Usages, Manners, Customs, Mores, and Morals, 
William Graham Sumner (considered one of the founders of sociology in the United States) distinguishes 
between enacted structures, which are deliberately created, and cressive structures, which slowly evolve 
more or less unplanned over lengthy periods of time (Sumner, 1906). More recently, W. Richard Scott 
defined institutions as “social structures that have attained a high degree of resilience [and] are 
composed of cultural-cognitive, normative, and regulative elements that, together with associated 
activities and resources, provide stability and meaning to social life”. (Scott, 2008a, p.48). Both 
Hodgson’s and Scott’s definitions contain important references to the need to distinguish between two 
main categories, namely formal and informal institutions.  
Formal institutions are founded on codified and explicit rules and standards that shape the interaction 
between members of society (North, 1990). They promote stability and regulation by providing 
authoritative behavioural guidelines, and by defining an established order within which individuals and 
firms operate (Scott, 2008a; Holmes et al., 2013). Formal institutions can be classified as regulatory (e.g. 
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property rights, rule of law, and the judiciary system), political (e.g. political rights, political stability, 
democratic quality, and the presence of the military in politics), or economic (e.g. labour, business and 
financial freedoms [Kunčić, 2014]). 
According to Zucker (1987), formal institutions are based on shared cognitive understandings and on 
their acceptance by the members of society. These elements can be involved in the realm of the so-called 
informal institutions. A well-known and widely-recognized definition of informal institutions was 
proposed by Helmke & Levitsky, who describe them as “socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that 
are created, communicated and enforced outside officially sanctioned channels, whereas formal 
institutions are created, communicated and enforced through channels that are widely accepted as 
official” (Helmke & Levitsky, 2006, p.5). As an example, North mentioned sanctions, taboos, customs, 
traditions, and codes of conduct. Helmke & Levitsky’s definition highlights some notable elements which 
help differentiate informal institutions from the formal ones, namely the fact that they are typically 
unwritten and that, although they are widely accepted and shared, they are not explicitly formalized. 
Moreover, as it can be inferred from Hodgson and Sumner’s statements, informal institutions can be 
considered as embedded social guidelines and codes of conduct, rather than established normative and 
regulative rules, and tend to be more persistent over time than the formal ones. Anyway, formal and 
informal institutions are neither parallel sets of rules, nor consecutive phases, but they interact and 
mutually influence one another (Chakraborty et. al, 2015). Helmke & Levitsky (2006) classify informal 
institutions in four categories, based on the effectiveness/ineffectiveness of the corresponding formal 
institutions, and on the compatibility/incompatibility of their respective goals. To be more specific, when 
their goals are compatible and the formal institutions are effective, then the informal institutions are 
complementary, in the sense that they reinforce the formal rules. The operating routines and procedures 
that facilitate complex operations in the business and public sectors are an example. In the event of 
effective formal institutions and conflicting goals, accommodating informal institutions will tend to 
modify or undermine the effectiveness of the formal rules without openly contradicting them. As an 
instance of this, Helmke & Levitsky (2006) mention the informal power-sharing arrangements made by 
the governing elite in Chile after the fall of Pinochet. When ineffective formal institutions are 
accompanied by contrasting goals, there will be competing informal institutions, which are incompatible 
with the formal rules (as in the case of corruption). Finally, substitutive informal institutions help 
societies to achieve outcomes that formal institutions were expected to produce, but failed to do so. An 
example lies in the informal loan networks that compensate for the formal court system when the latter 
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is weak (see Chakraborty et al., 2015, for instance). Helmke & Levitsky (2006) also highlight the 
elements that, despite sharing some of their features, should not be considered as informal institutions, 
namely weak institutions (which may be formal or informal), informal behavioural regularities (that, to 
be considered informal institutions, must respond to an established rule or guideline, the violation of 
which generates some kind of external sanction), informal organizations (which, in North’s view, play 
according to “the rule of the game”), and culture (which, according to the authors, is based on shared 
values while informal institutions are based on shared expectations; however, the two concepts are 
strictly related and partially overlap, as it will be underlined in section 2.3).  
 
2.2.2 Some relevant types of informal institution 
Three widely-acknowledged types of informal institution that emerge from the literature are trust, social 
networks, and corruption.  
Trust can be defined as the willingness to make oneself vulnerable to other people’s actions, based on 
beliefs about their trustworthiness (Bohenet, 2008). Trust helps solve problems of opportunism and moral 
hazard, it reduces the uncertainty of complex transactions for firms, it promotes interaction and flexibility 
among partners, and it facilitates the flow of information with consequently lower costs (Beugelsdijk, 
2005; Mèon & Sekkat, 2015). 
An informal institution closely related to trust is represented by social networks. They consist of social 
ties developed through interpersonal and inter-organizational relationships between individuals and 
firms, respectively (Inkpen & Tsang, 2005). Social networks allow trust to become transitive and spread, 
then trust boosts cooperation, and cooperation fosters trust, hence triggering a virtuous circle (Putnam et 
al., 1993). An interesting case concerns the well-established social networks typical of China called 
guanxi, which can be defined as personal relationships based on trust and reciprocity through which 
individuals exchange favours (Wang, 2000). Another example of a well-established, peculiar social 
network widespread in the Western Balkans is the exchange of ideas and opinions that flows in the mesni 
zajednicas. According to Mohamed & Mihailović (2014), these are “a traditional form of sub-municipal, 
community-based self-government (…) recognized as forums where citizens come together and discuss 
issues, decide on strategies and formulate proposals on issues of local significance” (Mohamed & 
Mihailović, 2014, p.81). Mesni zajednicas play an important part in promoting citizens’ participation in 
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decision-making at municipal level, and in service provision, partially compensating for inefficiencies of 
the formal institutions (Marćić, 2015).  In Japan, there are mutual help networks such as the youi 
(consisting in exchange of labour, typically among families), moyai (based on the redistribution of goods 
and services), and tetsudai (providing assistance with no expectation of reciprocity), which have 
traditionally been an important feature of Japanese society. Although the country changed profoundly 
during the last century, its tradition of mutual support persists, especially in farming villages (Onda, 
2013). 
Trust and social networks are also the object of a specific strand of literature focusing on a concept 
closely related to that of the informal institutions, social capital. According to Robert D. Putnam, social 
capital includes “those features of social organization, such as networks of individuals or households, 
and the associated norms and values that create externalities for the community as a whole” (Putnam et 
al., 1993, p.167). The literature on social capital typically also considers associative activity, a concept 
strongly related to that of social networks and referring to people’s participation in civic groups and non-
profit organizations. Knack & Keefer (1997) produced a list that include organizations dealing with social 
welfare services, religion, education, art and music, politics, human rights, environment protection, sports 
or recreation, youth work, health, animal rights, women’s rights and local community action, professional 
associations, and trade unions. In their famous study on the Italian regions, Make Democracy Work, 
Putnam et al. (1993) show that the crucial factor in explaining the differences in governments’ 
effectiveness and economic performance across Italy lay in regional disparities relating to the traditions 
of civic engagement and to the structure of the civic networks (which are based on associative activities). 
In particular, they found a positive link between high levels of social capital and high levels of 
government effectiveness and economic development.   
Trust and social networks are usually considered as complementary or substitutive informal institutions. 
Rather, corruption, as pointed out by Helmke & Hevitsky (2006), can be considered as a typical 
competing informal institution. Corruption, which consists in illegal informal exchanges involving the 
misuse of public power for private benefit, is a widespread phenomenon with ancient origins, as 
documented in Noonan’s work Bribes (Noonan, 1984). In the last two decades, a vast amount of 
empirical literature analysing the impact of corruption on economic growth and other economic and 
social variables has highlighted two main, opposite effects. According to the mainstream view, 
corruption damages the economy because it raises transaction costs for foreign investors (Bardhan, 
1997), carrying the risk of a loss of reputation and brand goodwill (Zhao et al., 2003), and causing 
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inefficiencies and market distortions by giving corrupt firms preferential access to lucrative markets 
(Habib & Zurawicki, 2002). On the other hand, corruption may help investors to circumvent long and 
inefficient bureaucratic procedures (Huntington, 1968), accelerate decision-making, and enable 
businesses to avoid onerous government regulations (Lui, 1985). Sometimes corruption may also help 
supplement low wages, enable governments to reduce taxes and partially compensate for weak regulatory 
systems, especially in developing countries (Tullock, 1996; Houston, 2007). As a final consideration on 
corruption, to avoid possible misunderstandings, it is worth adding that some authors use indicators that 
refer not to the perception of corruption, but to the efficacy with which it is controlled and prevented by 
the political authorities, as captured for instance by the Worldwide Governance Indicator “Control of 
corruption”. In such cases, corruption is typically included among the formal institutions. 
Beyond trust, social networks and corruption, some other elements are sometimes identified as informal 
institutions. As an illustration, Harriss-White (2010) suggests that the informal labour market, or so-
called shadow economy, can also be considered as an informal institution, and more specifically as a 
conflict management institution. Indeed, it represents a social welfare element in the economies where a 
more formal welfare system is lacking or very weak. A country’s informal labour market may have some 
effect on its inward FDI. In this respect, Lee & Park (2013) suggest that a considerably large informal 
labour market can influence a country’s FDI attractiveness by weakening a relevant formal institution, 
namely, the protection of intellectual property rights. Moreover, Kunčić & Jaklić (2014) employ 
indicators of the society’s attitudes towards liberalism and non-liberalism to capture informal institutions, 
while Holmes et al. (2013) investigate informal institutions in the form of the cultural dimensions of 
collectivism and future orientation.  More information about the aforementioned papers can be found in 
the literature review (section 2.3).  
 
2.2.3 Culture and religion  
Despite some peculiarities, culture and religion are two complex constructs closely related to informal 
institutions. Guiso, Sapienza & Zingales (2006, p.23) identify culture with “those customary beliefs and 
values that ethnic, religious, and social groups transmit fairly unchanged from generation to 
generation.” One of the most prominent contributors to the modern literature on culture is Geert 
Hofstede, who defines culture as “the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the 
members of one human group from another“ (Hofstede, 1984, p. 21). He suggests that the most important 
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differences between cultures can be captured by the extent to which they diverge in terms of certain 
cultural values, or domains, i.e. uncertainty avoidance, power distance, individualism vs collectivism, 
and masculinity vs femininity. Uncertainty avoidance indicates to what extent a culture shapes its 
members to feel more or less uncomfortable in unstructured and ambiguous situations. Power distance is 
the degree to which the less powerful members of organizations and institutions accept that power is 
unequally distributed, or even expect it to be so. Individualism (versus collectivism) involves the extent 
to which individuals are more or less tightly integrated in groups. Masculinity (versus femininity) refers 
to the role distribution between the genders; in particular, more masculine societies view roles as more 
rigidly gender-dependent, while there is more freedom concerning role selection, regardless of gender, 
in more feminine societies (Hofstede, 2001). Despite some criticism (see Schwartz, 1994, and 
McSweeney, 2002, for instance), Hofstede’s notion of culture is one of the most widely used in many 
research fields (Kaasa, 2015). More recently, Tabellini (2010) and Williamson & Kerekes (2011) 
identified four other cultural domains, namely trust, respect, individual self-determination, and 
obedience. Another cultural trait mentioned in the literature concerns the relevance of family ties in 
society. Alesina & Giuliano (2010) argue that societies with strong family ties experience lower levels 
of generalized trust and civic sense, and tend to have more home-based production (done largely by 
women, young adults, and older people). Like informal institutions, cultural traits tend to change more 
slowly than formal institutions (Alesina & Giuliano, 2010, Fernández & Fogli, 2009 and Giavazzi, 
Petkov & Schiantarelli, 2014), and they interact with formal institutions (Alesina & Giuliano, 2015 and 
Alesina et al., 2015). 
 Due to the strict relationship and overlaps between informal institutions and culture, to the point that the 
latter can be considered as an important reflection of a country’s informal institutions (North, 1990; Peng 
et al., 2008), in the empirical part I included also some cultural values among the variables capturing 
informal institutions. 
Religion is another construct having strong links with informal institutions, and especially with culture 
(as an illustration, Barro & McClerry, 2003, define religion as one important dimension of culture). Ever 
since the publication of Max Weber’s seminal work, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism 
(Weber et al., 2002 [1905]), numerous studies have investigated the effects of individuals’ religious 
affiliation and/or religiosity (a more elusive concept that captures the strength of an individual’s belief 
in God and participation in religious activities) in a given country on a variety of economic variables. 
These include entrepreneurship (Audretsch et al., 2007; Carswell & Rolland, 2007; Wiseman & Young, 
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2014; Nunziata & Rocco, 2016), productivity (Islam, 2008; Grafton et al., 2002; Gorodnichenko & 
Roland, 2010; Kaasa, 2015), income (Iannaccone, 1998, Barro & McCleary, 2003, Bettendorf & 
Dijkgraaf, 2010, Kortt et. al., 2012; Sinnewe et al., 2016), and economic attitudes (Lal, 2001; Minarik, 
2014).  
 
2.2.4 Informal institutions and inward FDI 
Trust, social networks and corruption are likely to have an impact on inward FDI. A trust-based business 
environment is expected to favour inward FDI, since it reduces the probability of opportunistic behaviour 
in the local market (a key concern for foreign investors), it facilitates the development of cooperative 
business relationships with local stakeholders, and it lowers monitoring costs. Like trust, sound social 
networks should foster FDI because they give foreign investors opportunities to have contacts in 
organizations with various backgrounds and professions, and allow them to establish durable professional 
relationships (Zhao & Kim, 2011). For instance, guanxi support not only Chinese people, but also foreign 
investors. Indeed, they complement official law by clarifying legal ambiguities and providing access to 
legal contract enforcement and dispute settlement mechanisms, and they secure potentially highly-
profitable business opportunities by compensating for the high investment risks involved (Wang, 2000). 
With regard to corruption, its effect on multinational firms’ decisions is ambiguous for the reasons 
illustrated in section 2.2. 
Also religion and culture can influence to some extent inward FDI. In particular, the empirical study 
conducted by Hahn & Bunyaratavej (2010) suggests that a higher level of uncertainty avoidance and a 
tendency for masculinity in a given country are negatively associated with its appeal to FDI, while a 
greater power distance and a tendency for individualism favour FDI inflows. While, as mentioned in 
section 2.3, there is a vast literature on religion and several economic variables, few empirical studies 
have concerned the influence of religion on FDI, and almost all of them (e.g. Hergueux, 2011) use 
gravitational models in which the key independent variable is not the host country’s religiosity or 
religious affiliation(s), but the “distance” between those of the host and home countries, and the 
dependent variable is bilateral FDI. With regard to total inward FDI, Sathe & Handley-Schachler (2006) 
examine the effect on FDI inflows of several factors, including religion, in different Indian regions, 




2.2.5 The main datasets used to construct indicators of informal institutions 
The increasing attention paid to the role of informal institutions in societies, and to how they interact 
with formal institutions, has been supported by a greater availability of datasets, typically based on 
surveys administered to households or firms, that provide, or allow researchers to easily derive 
measurable and comparable indicators of these institutions.  
Several studies derive their indices of informal institutions -including culture and religion- from data 
contained in the World Value Survey (WVS), the European Value Survey (EVS) and/or the European 
Social Survey (ESS). These extensive datasets are based on large-scale, cross-national and longitudinal 
surveys designed to empirically investigate the moral and social values and beliefs of the people living 
in the countries being surveyed. The WVS currently comprises six waves (1981-1984, 1990-1994, 1995-
1998, 1999-2004, 2005-2009 and 2010-2014) covering nearly a hundred countries in all; the latest one 
available in 2017 concerns 46 countries. The EVS and ESS focus on European countries and, to date 
(2018), the EVS has released four waves (1981, 1990, 1999 and 2008) that have involved increasing 
numbers of countries (reaching 46 in the latest wave), while the ESS (which is updated biennially and 
covers fewer countries) has published eight waves (2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014 and 2016). 
One question posed by all three surveys is whether the respondent thinks that most people can be trusted. 
Their answers are often used by sociologists, sometimes combined with other related queries, to build a 
trust-based indicator. The core concept underlying this index relates to interpersonal trust, generally 
meaning trust in physically proximal individuals, such as neighbours or people living in the same town. 
Some researchers, such as Baliamoune-Lutz (2011) and Ahmad & Hall (2017), believe that a trust 
indicator should reflect trust in strangers too, and that an indicator based on the WVS, EVS or ESS suffers 
from limited data availability across years, so they have employed alternative measures of trust. One of 
these is the contract-intensive money (CIM) indicator, which should reflect the trust placed by individuals 
entering into monetary transactions in a large number of individuals not necessarily known to them, as 
well as their confidence in being repaid (Baliamoune-Lutz, 2011). 
Another interesting data source is the Global Competitiveness Report on the economic and social 
performance of more than a hundred countries, released annually by the World Economic Forum. For 
each country scrutinized, this report provides a series of institutional indicators, including some related 
to firms’ values, informal practices and relationships, based on extensive interviews with business 
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executives. For instance, Seyoum (2011), whose paper is included in the literature review presented in 
section 2.3, resorts to these indices to build an indicator of informal institutions.  
Finally, two widely-used measures of corruption, covering more than 150 countries, are the Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI), and the corruption index contained in the International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG). The corruption index in the ICRG assesses corruption within political systems and is one of the 
twelve components of the political risk rating released by the PRS Group on a monthly or annual basis 
(PRS Group, 2012). The CPI has been issued annually since 1995 by Transparency International, the 
largest not-for-profit organization committed to fighting corruption. Another index capturing perceptions 
about corruption is the “Control of Corruption” Worldwide Governance Indicator, issued annually by the 
World Bank and covering numerous countries. As mentioned in section 2.3, the Control of Corruption 
index is typically included among the indicators of formal institutions since it can be interpreted as an 
indication of how effectively governments control illegal practices.  
 
2.3 A review of recent empirical studies 
Interest in the relationship between informal institutions and certain important economic variables, such 
as inward FDI, has been rapidly growing in the last two decades. This section reviews twenty recent 
empirical papers (selected as briefly explained in section 2.4) on how a host country’s informal 
institutions affect its FDI inflows. To provide a compact but useful overview of the selected articles, and 
make it easier to compare them, Table 2.1 condenses the following information for each paper: year of 
publication, author(s), the FDI-related dependent variable, types of informal institution considered, types 
of formal institution (if modelled), and main conclusions. A more detailed version of Table 2.1, that 
includes the name of the journal that published the study, the proxies used to measure the informal 
institutions, further information on the institutional variables, and the time frame in question is available 
upon request (as well as, for readers interested in delving further into these topics, another similar table 
which reviews twenty recent empirical papers on the effects of informal institutions, including culture 
and religion, on a variety of interesting economic outcomes other than inward FDI, such as income, 
entrepreneurship and productivity).   
A look at Table 2.1 prompts some considerations. First, the authors use quite different measures of the 
amount of inward FDI (see column 2), not just the more often-used FDI inflows, but also the number of 
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FDI projects, for instance (e.g. Hahn & Bunyaratavej, 2010), and the probability of FDI being made in a 
given country (e.g. Smarzynska & Wei, 2000) or region (e.g. Choe & Lee, 2016). The articles investigate 
different factors that might be seen as the types of informal institution described in section 2.2, namely 
trust, social networks, corruption, the informal labour market and cultural values (column 3). 
Since most of the empirical papers dealing with FDI and religiosity employ gravitational models (as 
mentioned in section 2.2), none of the studies considered here include religious indicators. Several 
authors build indicators of informal institutions from the WVS, EVS and/or ESS, with the aid of data 
reduction techniques. A particular case concerns Wang (2000), and Sekkat (2014), who only include 
formal institutions in their empirical model, inferring the relevance of informal institutions, which may 
attenuate the effectiveness of the formal institutions, or compensate for their ineffectiveness, from the 
lack of significance of the institutional factors (typically affecting FDI) that are modelled. Column 4 
refers to the inclusion of indicators of formal institutions. In particular, two studies (Holmes et al, 2013; 
Kunčić & Jaklić, 2014) adopt comprehensive indices of formal institutions derived with the aid of data 
reduction techniques from a broad set of institutional variables contained in different datasets. Column 5 
provides some basic information on the sample of host countries considered in each study. The samples 
labelled as heterogeneous contain a mix of advanced, transition and developing economies2 from various 
geographical areas. The three papers marked with an asterisk in Table 2.1 conduct their analysis either 
on different regions of the same country ( Mudamba & Navarra, 2003; Choe & Lee, 2016), or on a very 
specific area and sector (Saleh et al., 2017). For this reason, they are not used as primary studies in the 
meta-analysis. The study by Paniagua et al. (2017), marked with two asterisks in Table 2.1, represents 
an interesting but a bit peculiar case: it investigates the role played by online social-networks, such as 
Facebook and Twitter, on FDI.  
 
                                                          
2 I adopted the United Nations classification of countries to identify developing economies. They represent a quite heterogeneous group of 
countries, including both fast-growing economies such as China, India and Vietnam and poor emerging economies such as Sub-Saharan 
countries. While the UN classification labels also the Eastern European countries which joined the EU as advanced economies, I included 
the latter in the “transition economies” group, together with the Western Balkans’ countries and the CIS countries. 
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Table 2.1 Empirical papers investigating the effects of informal institutions on a country’s attraction of FDI  
 
1. Author(s)  










4. Type(s) of formal 
institution  (if 
modeled) 
5. Sample of 
host countries 
6. Main conclusions 




Corruption is probably not a major deterrent against inward FDI because there are informal 
institutions (such as guanxi in China) that compensate for the shortcomings of the legal 
system.  
Smarzynska & 
Wei (2000)  
prob. of a 
FDI in a 
given 
country 
CORR NOT_MOD 22 transition 
economies 
A higher level of corruption in a host country is associated with a lower probability of FDI. 
Mudambi & 
Navarra (2003)*  




POL_INST Italian regions A move towards a center-right political orientation and an increase in Putnam's index of civic 
institutions have a positive, significant effect on inward FDI, whereas an increment in the 
concentration of political power has a very significant negative influence.  









Uncertainty avoidance discourages inward FDI and weakens the positive effect of trust. 
Li & Filer (2007)    FDI 
inflows and 
% of inward 






countries    
Good governance increases FDI inflows, but it is important also to consider indirect foreign 
investment. In particular, the latter are preferred to FDI in countries with a weak 









CULT POL_INST The host 
countries of 
greenfield FDI 
in the service 
sector from the 
UK,the US, 
Host countries with lower levels of uncertainty avoidance and higher levels of individualism 





Seyoum (2011)  FDI inflows SOC_NT LEG_INST 119 
heterogeneous 
countries 
There is a positive relationship between informal institutions and inward FDI, which is 
partially mediated by formal institutions.  











Trust and associative activity are relevant determinants of FDI inflows and their effects are 
further strengthened by high regulatory quality. 
Mudambi et al. 
(2013)  
  FDI 
inflows 
CORR EC_INST 55 developing 
countries 
FDI are negatively associated with corruption, which tends to be higher where there is little 
protection for property rights and scarce trade freedom.  






A greater freedom from corruption is associated with a significant increase in inward FDI. 
Wu et al. (2012)   FDI 
inflows; % 
of  inward 







Family-based and relational-based countries attract the highest amounts of FDI relative to the 
total amount of foreign investments.  
Holmes et al. 
(2013)  





Countries' informal institutions shape their formal institutions, which in turn affect their level 
of inward FDI in various ways. 
Lee & Park 
(2013)  
FDI inflows INF_LM LEG_INST 11 Asian 
countries  
Stronger IPR protection attracts more FDI in countries with small informal economies, but 
not in countries with large informal economies. 




In MENA countries corruption is positively, significantly associated with inward FDI.  
Sekkat (2014)  FDI inflows SOC_NT LEG_INST 13 Arabic 
countries 
Since the quality of formal institutions matters only for non-Arab countries, intra-Arab 
investments are likely to be driven by social networks and similar beliefs.  









Not only the host country's political and legal institutions, but also its liberal public opinion 
have a positive effect on inward FDI. 
Quazi (2014)  
 















Notes: the year in brackets refers to the year of the study’s publication in a journal, with the exception of the two working papers (Smarzynska & Wei, 2000 and Lee & Park, 
2013).  
6.b LEGEND: SOC_NT: social networks; TR: trust; CULT: cultural values, namely: individualism, collectivism, power distance, uncertainty avoidance, future orientation, attitude 
towards liberalism/non-liberalism and (in Mudambi & Navarra, 2003) Putnam’s index of civil institutions; CORR: corruption; INF_LM: informal labor market; LEG_INST: legal 
institutions (e.g. property rights); POL_INST: political institutions (e.g. political rights, government policies); EC_INST: economic institutions (e.g. indices of economic 
freedoms); NOT_MOD: not modelled.   




TR LEG_INST 46 advanced 
and developing 
countries 
Formal and informal institutions are substitutes when it comes to attracting FDI. 
Choe & Lee 
(2016)*  
probability 




NOT_MOD 15 South 
Korean regions 
"Trust and Norms" is a relevant locational factor for foreign investors in South Korea, while 
the "Social networks" factor is typically not statistically significant. 
Jalil et al. (2016)  FDI inflows CORR NOT_MOD 43 developing 
countries 
Generally, corruption has a positive impact on FDI inflows in the case of Asia and Africa, 
while it has a negative impact in the case of Latin America. 






SOC_NT POL_INST 87  
heterogeneous  
countries 
Online social networks’ activities stimulate greenfield FDI. 









CULT POL_INST Vietnam (with 
focus on Ho Chi 
Minh City’s 
service sector) 
Not only market-seeking motives and government policies, but also culture have a strong 
impact on FDI location decisions related to the Vietnamese service industries. 
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Although they could be considered as an ultimate version of the concept of social networks illustrated in 
section 2.2, they are not related to a specific physical place, such as the destination country of FDI, since 
they could be joined by individuals and firms from all around the world. On the other hand, also this 
paper deals with the multinational firms’ ability to join informal networks, which could represent an 
opportunity for both the investor company and the local firms and policy-makers of the host country to 
better know each other, to reduce skepticism and prejudices and to create contacts. For these reasons, I 
included this paper in the meta-analysis but, as sensitivity analysis, I also estimated the model without 
including it (see section 2.5).  Finally, column 6 briefly summarizes the main conclusions, highlighting 
the effects of the informal institution(s) scrutinized on inward FDI and, in some cases, also the interplay 
between formal and informal institutions. From a preliminary analysis of these studies it can be observed, 
for instance, that: informal institutions can act as substitutes or complements of formal institutions or can 
mediate the effect of the latter on FDI (e.g. Wang, 2000; Seyum, 2011; Holmes et al., 2013); corruption 
typically discourages inward FDI, but can also favour it, especially in some peculiar sample of host 
countries (e.g. Helmy, 2013; Jalil et al., 2016); trust and social networks typically encourage inward FDI 
(e.g. Seyoum, 2011; Zhao & Kim, 2011). More rigorous and general conclusions can be drawn from the 
meta-analysis (see sections from 2.4 to 2.6).  
 
2.4 Data and research methodology  
After shedding more light on the informal institutions construct, the second main aim of this work is to 
employ the available studies on how informal institutions affect inward FDI to empirically test whether 
and to what extent these factors attract and/or discourage foreign investors. For this purpose, I selected 
twenty-two recent empirical studies dealing with this issue (see section 2.3 for a qualitative review), by 
means of a procedure briefly explained later. The selected articles differ considerably in terms of their 
main findings, and also in important aspects, such as the type(s) of informal institution considered, the 
estimation methods used, and the number of observations. Therefore, I statistically explored this 
heterogeneity by conducting a simple meta-analysis. 
A meta-analysis can be defined as a quantitative review of empirical studies on the same issue, the main 
aim of which is to empirically assess their findings, to identify the main drivers of the latter (Ghisetti & 
Pontoni, 2015) and both to summarize and to explain the wide, often disparate, variation found among 
the reported results (Stanley et al., 2013). Such a combined statistical analysis helps overcome certain 
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limitations typical of single studies (such as measurement inaccuracies, limited reliability, restricted 
research range, small sample size and low statistical power), and enables more general and robust 
conclusions to be drawn (Borenstein et al., 2011). Stanley and Jarrell, two prominent experts on meta-
analytic techniques, claim that meta-analysis offers “a framework in which to organize and interpret 
exact and inexact replications, to review more objectively the literature and explain its disparities, and 
to engage in the self-analysis of investigating the socioeconomic phenomenon of social scientific 
research itself” (Stanley & Jarrell, 2005, p. 306). Despite some limitations, concerning in particular the 
risk of personal judgement by the researcher (see Greco et al., 2013, for a review of what he defines the 
main “pitfalls” of a meta-analysis), meta-analysis has traditionally been used for research in the medical 
sciences and education, but has become more and more popular in the social sciences too, including 
international economics. Some authors have recently used meta-analytical models to examine the FDI 
determinants (e.g. Bailey, 2016; Tokunaga & Iwasaki, 2017) and FDI effects (e.g. Havranek & Irsova, 
2011; Iwasaki & Tokunaga, 2016; Demena & van Bergeijk, 2017) identified by a large number of 
researchers. The basic meta-regression analysis is based on the following equation: 
 
 𝑏𝑗 =∝ + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑍𝑗𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=1 + 𝑒𝑗                             𝑗 = 1,2,3 … . 𝑁                                                    (1) 
 
where: 
 -bj is the estimate of the meta-dependent variable corresponding to the j
th regression model of a selected 
study, capturing the so-called effect size, namely the magnitude of the association between the variables 
of interest (i.e. FDI and informal institutions in this work);  
- ∝ is the “true” value of the parameter of interest; 
- Zjk is the set of the meta-independent variables (usually called moderators), which reflect relevant 
characteristics of an empirical study and drive the magnitude and the sign of the effect size; 
- βk are the coefficients of the moderators;  
- ej is the meta-regression disturbance term.  
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The articles comprised in the meta-analysis are typically known as primary studies, and the 
corresponding regression models provide the observations of the meta-regressions. Primary studies are 
selected by exploring the existing literature on a given topic (e.g. the relationship between economic 
growth and FDI) and applying a set of identification criteria to obtain a sample. The meta-dependent 
variable is often an OLS-estimated regression coefficient drawn from each original regression model; 
although the OLS estimates are unbiased and consistent, some meta-analysts prefer to focus on the t-
statistics reported by the primary studies because the meta-regression errors are very likely to be 
heteroskedastic due to the marked variability of the datasets, sample sizes and regressors in the primary 
literature. The t-statistic is a dimensionless, standardized measure of the critical parameter of interest 
(Stanley & Jarrell, 2005). When a selected study does not allow for the meta-dependent variable to be 
estimated in these ways - when the limited availability of empirical studies on a given topic makes it 
necessary to include qualitative studies, for instance – then a meta logit or probit model can be used 
(Stanley & Doucouliagos, 2012). To give an example, a binary variable can be created that takes a value 
of 1 if the economic phenomenon being investigated is significant, and 0 otherwise (Ghisetti & Pontoni, 
2015). The moderators are often dichotomous variables and capture important characteristics of a study, 
such as the use of a cross-section or of a panel data model, the use of a single equation or of simultaneous 
systems, the inclusion or exclusion of certain relevant variables, the sample size, and the time frame.  
In this work, I chose a meta-probit model because the sample size is limited, the FDI-related dependent 
variables are quite heterogeneous, and it is impossible to obtain t-statistics from a number of the studies 
selected. Moreover, the probit functional form has the advantage of being bounded between 0 and 1, 
implying that the predicted values cannot lie beyond the probability range and entail homoscedastic 
errors (Ghisetti & Pontoni, 2015). The observations are eighty-one relevant regression models (models 
that do not include informal institutions among the regressors or that do not provide further information 
for the purpose of meta-analysis are excluded) corresponding to the empirical papers reviewed in section 
2.3, with the exception of Mudambi & Navarra (2003), Choe & Lee (2016) and Saleh et al. (2017), as 
anticipated in section 2.3, and of Li & Filer (2007), as explained below. These articles were collected by 
analyzing the results provided by Scopus and the Social Science Research Network (SSRN) for 
combinations of the keyword “FDI” with keywords relating to informal institutions, i.e. “informal 
institutions”, “informal”, “social capital”, “corruption”, “culture”, “social networks”, “business 
networks”, “beliefs”, “religion”, “religious”, “religiosity” (last access: 21.03.2018). Working papers 
were sought in the above-mentioned sources and also in the Research Papers in Economics (RePEc) 
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database, and the lists of working papers issued by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. 
Among the inclusion criteria adopted, the selected studies has to include an econometric model in which 
the factors briefly described in section 2.2 are considered as informal institutions, and employ some 
measures of inward FDI as dependent variables. Papers that use gravitational models were excluded, 
with the exception of the one by Kunčić & Jaklić (2014) since the authors use not the institutional distance 
between pairs of countries, but the absolute value of these institutional factors measured in the economies 
sampled, as the independent variable related to informal institutions. This enable the authors to draw 
conclusions on the effect on inward FDI of an interesting, little-explored type of informal institution, 
namely attitudes for and against liberalism. In addition, since one of the shortcomings of meta-analysis 
is the risk of within-study dependence, the reciprocal citations of the selected studies were checked. 
While eight out of the nine3 articles involved in these reciprocal citations did not raise serious concerns 
about their inter-dependence, the study conducted by Li and Filer (2007) was dropped because a more 
recent one (Wu et al., 2012), which include Li among the authors, is partly based on the results of the 
earlier work by Li & Filer (2007). In addition, two regression models in the Wu et al. (2012) paper were 
excluded because their dependent variable is not the amount of inward FDI in absolute terms, but the 
percentage of FDI out of the total amount of foreign investment. There are far more empirical studies on 
the impact of corruption on FDI than studies dealing with other types of informal institution. I 
consequently used a random sample of articles corresponding to the combination of keywords “FDI” and 
“corruption”, and fulfilling the other above-mentioned criteria, as suggested by Stanley & Doucouliagos 
(2012) in the event of large amounts of results being available. I also considered two unpublished papers; 
their limited number was due not only to the paucity of working papers on this topic, but also to the 
difficulty of gaining access to some of them. Generally speaking, including unpublished papers in the 
sample of primary studies should mitigate the risk of encountering one of the main forms of publication 
bias, a broad term encompassing all possible biases of a study (including those relating to its size, 
direction and statistical significance, but also to its availability and accessibility) according to which 
studies with significant or expected findings are more likely to be published (McShane et al., 2016).  
I identified and then alternatively used two dichotomous meta-dependent variables:  
                                                          
3 Smarzynska & Wei (2000) is cited by Mudambi et al. (2013), by Helmy (2013) and by Quazi (2014); Li & Filer (2007) is cited by Seyoum 
(2012) and by Wu et al. (2012); Bhardwaj (2007) is cited by Wu et al. (2012) and by Zhao & Kim (2011); and Seyoum is cited by Wu et 




 -SIGNIF: which takes a value of 1 if the effect of at least one of the informal institutions included in a 
regression model is significant, and 0 otherwise; 
-SIGN_POS: which takes a value of 1 if informal institutions significantly attract inward FDI, and 0 
otherwise. 4 
To capture a number of relevant characteristics of the models used in the primary studies5, I selected the 
following moderators:  
- IMF5: the five-year impact factor of the journal publishing the study, used as proxy for the relevance 
of that journal; 
- FWCI: the field weight citation impact provided by Scopus, which shows how well cited an article by 
comparison with similar articles; it takes a value of 1 if this index is higher than 1;  
- several macro-categories of informal institutions, namely: relationships and values typically facilitating 
FDI (VALPOS_REL), namely trust, social networks, individualism, collectivism, future orientation, 
power distance and attitude toward liberalism; illegal practices (ILL), including corruption and the 
informal labour market; values typically interfering with FDI (VAL_NEG), that is  uncertainty avoidance 
and attitudes against liberalism.  These indicators take a value of 1 if the corresponding type of institution 
is modelled in the regression model in question;  
-FORM:  the inclusion or exclusion of indicators of formal institutions;  
 
                                                          
4 As stated in the note to Table A.2.1, since the main aim of the empirical analysis is to understand whether some types of informal institution 
may increase a country’s attractiveness in terms of inward FDI, I did not use also the variable NEG_SIG as dependent variable. Anyway, 
the main results of probit regressions with NEG_SIG are that, as expected, VALPOS_REL is negatively significant, while VAL_NEG is 
positively significant. 
5 Other possible regressors - namely the “age” of the paper (given by the time elapsing between the current year, 2017, and the year when 
it was published), the use of a dependent variable other than FDI inflows, and the number of regressors - were not included because they 
were never significant or they correlated closely with other variables. In particular, the “age” of a study is partly captured by the FWCI. 




 -PREV_DEV: the prevalence of developing economies (at least 60% of the countries) in the sample6  
-PAN: the use of a panel data model rather than a cross-section;  
-NOT_LIN: the use or non-use of a non-linear regression model as an estimation technique (i.e. probit 
and logit models, or panel count data models);  
-NUM_OBS: the number of observations.  
With the exception of those referring to the journal’s impact factor and the number of observations, all 
the above-listed moderators are dichotomous variables, which take a value of 1 when the related 
characteristic is displayed in a regression model. A glance at the values taken by each of the above-
mentioned variables in all the regression models prompts a few preliminary considerations. Due to 
limited space, the table condensing this information is reported in the Appendix (Table A.2.1). Since 
about 79% of the whole set of regression models found informal institutions significant, I surmise that 
informal institutions have some impact on inward FDI according to most of the empirical literature 
reviewed. Moreover, almost all the primary regression models include developing economies among the 
host countries and about 59% of them are based on samples which are mainly made up of developing 
countries. This suggests that the issue about the relevance of informal institutions for inward FDI may 
be of particular interest for this type of economy.  The Appendix contains two other tables with illustrate, 
respectively, the summary statistics for these variables (Table A.2.2) and the matrix of the pairwise 
correlations between the regressors (Table A.2.3).  According to Table A.2.3, three pairwise correlations 
are notably high (higher than 70%), namely: the correlation between ILL and VALPOS_REL, equal to -
1, since the studies included in the meta-analysis either focus on corruption and related activities, or on 
social networks and values favouring or in favour of FDI; the correlation between PREV_DEV and ILL, 
equal to 77.53; the correlation between PREV_DEV and VALPOS_REL, amounting to -77.53. These 
last two values are related to the fact that most of the authors of the sample who focus on developing 
economies are interested in investigating the effect of corruption on inward FDI, probably because 
corruption is often widespread in these countries but also because, especially when it can partially 
compensate for weak formal institutions, as it may happen in these countries, it could either discourage, 
or attract FDI.  
                                                          
6 I included this dummy variable, rather than a dummy equal to 1 in case some developing economies were included in the sample, since 
the latter would take value 1 in more than 90 % of the observations and then it would be dropped from the model. 
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A more rigorous analysis of the factors driving these results can be done by estimating the empirical 
model, which is based on the following equations: 
𝑆𝐼𝐺𝑁𝐼𝐹 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼𝐹5 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐴𝐿_𝑁𝐸𝐺 + 𝛽3𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑃𝑂𝑆_𝑅𝐸𝐿 + 𝛽4𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀 + 𝛽5𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆 + 𝛽6𝑃𝐴𝑁 +
 +𝛽7𝑁𝑂𝑇_𝐿𝐼𝑁 +  𝛽8𝑁𝑈𝑀_𝑂𝐵𝑆+ ∈                                                                                                      (2)                                                                                          
 𝑆𝐼𝐺𝑁_𝑃𝑂𝑆 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼𝐹5 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐴𝐿_𝑁𝐸𝐺 + 𝛽3𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑃𝑂𝑆_𝑅𝐸𝐿 + 𝛽4𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀 + 𝛽5𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆 + 𝛽6𝑃𝐴𝑁 +
 +𝛽7𝑁𝑂𝑇_𝐿𝐼𝑁 +  𝛽8𝑁𝑈𝑀_𝑂𝐵𝑆+ ∈                                                                                                      (3)                                                                        
 
Due to the dichotomous nature of the three dependent variables, equations 2 and 3 are estimated with 
probit models that explain whether the presence of each moderator raises or lowers the probability of 
each dependent variable amounting to 1. To account for heteroscedasticity, all the standard errors are 
clustered by article. 
 
2.5 Empirical results and discussion 
The results of the estimation of the model introduced in section 2.4 are illustrated in Table 2.2. 
Column 1 and column 2 refer to the main model specification, in which all the observations and all the 
regressors are used. According to column 1, the probability of informal institutions to significantly affect 
(either encourage or discourage) inward FDI -namely, that SIGNIF is equal to 1- is higher when informal 
institutions take the form of social networks, rather than illegal activities (taken as the default category) 
and values typically not in favor of FDI. On the other hand, this probability is lower when formal 
institutions are modelled, because part of the overall effect of institutions on inward FDI derives from 
the formal ones. Moreover, since the variable PAN is not statistically significant (in column 1 as well as 
in all the other columns of Table 2.2), the significance of informal institutions is not driven by the choice 
of a panel data rather than a cross-section model, and this is probably partly due to the nature of informal 
institutions, which tend to change very slowly over time. Hence, a cross-section may be appropriate too 
for modelling the relationship between FDI and informal institutions. Rather, the variable NOT_LIN, as 
well as the observations that employ non-linear regressions, are automatically dropped due to the limited 
number of cases in which they take on value 1. In addition, while the journals’ five-year impact factor 
correlates negatively with SIGNIF (an element that could imply the presence of some publication bias), 
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the greater the importance of a study in terms of the number of its citations, the higher the likelihood of 
informal institutions being significant. This suggests that researchers should both take formal and 
informal institutions into account when analyzing the effect of institutions on FDI or other economic 
variables. Finally, it is noteworthy that the dummy variable referring to the prevalence of developing 
countries in the sample is highly significant. Hence, as suggested by the preliminary analysis of Table 
A.2.3, it seems that informal institutions can play a notable role in influencing inward FDI especially in 
these economies.  
The sign of the effect being investigated is analyzed in column 2, in which the dependent variable is 
POS_SIG. According to the estimates, the sign is significantly influenced by the type of informal 
institution taken into account. More specifically, by comparison with illegal activities, values such as 
trust or attitude towards liberalism and social networks raise the probability of informal institutions 
attracting FDI, while values typically not facilitating FDI (e.g. illiberal public opinion and uncertainty 
avoidance). This result provides further support to the positive relationship between these two variables 
which typically emerges from the theoretical and the empirical literature. On the other hand, as expected, 
uncertainty avoidance and attitude towards non-liberalism are associated with a higher probability of the 
sign being negative. Like in column 1, the variable PREV_DEV is still highly significant. This may 
suggest researchers to further investigate the effect of social networks, trust and related values in these 
countries, especially considering that, as pointed out in section 2.4, most of the studies dealing with 
developing countries included in the meta-analysis focus on corruption.   
Columns from 3 to 8 are devoted to some sensitivity analyses. In particular, in column 3 and column 4 
the non-linear regressions are excluded (the results in column 3, as expected, replicate the results of 
column 1, in which NOT_LIN is dropped, a part from a couple of irrelevant differences in the robust 
standard errors); in column 5 and column 6 only the published papers are included in the sample; in 
column 7 and column 8, the paper by Paniagua et al. (2017), which resorts to a peculiar type of social 
network as briefly explained in section 2.3, is excluded from the regressions. All the major findings 
related to the main model specification are confirmed: indeed, the five-year impact factor is negatively 
significant with the dependent variable SIGNIF while PAN is never statistically significant, the variable 
VAL_POS and PREV_DEV have still a relevant positive impact with both SIGNIF and POS_SIG, and 
FORM_INS has always a negative sign. Finally, as a robustness check, I re-estimated the model after 
assigning each observation a frequency weight according to the number of repeated regressions included 
in each study. The main conclusions that can be drawn from the unweighted estimates do not change. As 
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an illustration, in column 9 and in column 10 I reported the weighted estimates for the main specification 
model.  
Although these results prompt some interesting considerations also in terms of recommendations to 
multinational firms and policy-makers (as it will be highlighted in the conclusive section 2.6), the present 
empirical analysis suffers from some limitations. First, the conclusions drawn from a meta-analysis are 
generally only valid with respect to the papers analyzed (Ghisetti & Pontoni, 2015), and their validity 
can be undermined by inaccuracies in the primary studies. For instance, only some authors of the papers 
reviewed (i.e. Mudambi et al, 2012; Helmy, 2013; Sekkat, 2014, Mèon & Sekkat, 2015; Paniagua et al., 
2017) deal with the issue of endogeneity of some explanatory variables, including the informal institution 
considered. Second, the present meta-analysis is based on a relatively limited number of observations 
due to the paucity of empirical papers focusing on the relationship between inward FDI and informal 
institutions other than corruption for more than a single country.  
Moreover, the focus on this study is on institutions at national level; two interesting papers included in 
the literature review (Mudambi & Navarra, 2003; Choe & Lee, 2016) focus on inward FDI and informal 
institutions in regions, rather than in countries, and should remind of the relevance of regional institutions 





                                                          
7 An interesting recent paper by Casi & Resmini [Casi, L. & Resmini, L. (2017). Foreign direct investment, regional identity and economic 
growth, Scienze Regionali, 16(2), 171-200] has explored this issue using the European regions as sample. I did not included in the literature 
review since it focuses on FDI-induced spillovers conducive to growth and because, apart from the abstract, it is written in Italian language. 
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Table 2.2  Results of the Probit regressions 
 main specification linear regressions only published papers only 
paper by Paniagua et al. 
excluded 
main specification with 
weights 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
dep.variable ---> SIGNIF POS_SIG SIGNIF POS_SIG SIGNIF POS_SIG SIGNIF POS_SIG SIGNIF POS_SIG 
regressors                    
IF5 -0.4886*** -0.302 -0.4886*** -0.2517 -0.5909** -0.603 -0.558*** -0.231 -0.4138** -0.0260 
  (0.1800) (0.216) (0.1800) (0.2237) (0.2453) (0.559) (0.156) (0.220) (0.1846) (0.285) 
FWCI 0.9690* 0.192 0.9690* 0.1718 0.5907 -0.568 0.960* 0.0359 1.0803*** -0.158 
  (0.5480) (1.045) (0.5480) (1.0399) (0.6009) (1.005) (0.552) (1.049) (0.3921) (1.208) 
VALPOS_REL 5.2161*** 8.146*** 5.2161*** 5.8080*** 4.6100*** 4.910*** 5.199*** 5.757*** 5.2845*** 5.949** 
  (0.3900) (1.977) (0.3898) (0.8388) (0.5274) (0.845) (0.414) (0.909) (0.2737) (2.454) 
VAL_NEG -1.1760 -2.169*** -1.1760 -1.9631*** -1.2334 -2.335*** 0.688 -7.394 -1.3601* -1.524* 
  (0.8821) (0.507) (0.8821) (0.5703) (0.9757) (0.800) (0.911) (4.916) (0.7563) (0.847) 
PAN -0.1096 -0.335 -0.1096 -0.3637 -0.2244 -0.397 0.247 -0.502 -0.2268 -0.991 
  (0.5633) (0.581) (0.5633) (0.6089) (0.6598) (0.475) (0.527) (0.630) (0.5812) (0.926) 
PREV_DEV 4.5629*** 7.042*** 4.5629*** 4.7827*** 4.3527*** 4.413*** 4.267*** 4.938*** 4.4704*** 5.928*** 
  (0.6961) (1.239) (0.6959) (0.5839) (0.7141) (0.726) (0.523) (0.627) (0.7378) (1.381) 
FORM_INS -1.1812*** -0.689* -1.1812*** -0.6952* -1.0970** -0.265 -1.434*** -0.186 -1.3389*** -0.536 
  (0.3324) (0.411) (0.3324) (0.4215) (0.4729) (0.710) (0.376) (0.424) (0.2912) (0.508) 
NUM_OBS -0.0000 1.24e-05 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.92e-05 
-
0.000368*** 0.000724 -0.0000 2.34e-05 
  (0.0000) (1.12e-05) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (2.13e-05) (0.000110) (0.000547) (0.0000) (2.53e-05) 
NOT_LIN omitted 1.233     omitted 2.804 omitted omitted omitted 0.483 
    (0.765)       (2.227)      (1.114) 
Constant -2.9631*** -6.520*** 2.9631*** -4.2561*** -2.1640*** -3.1650** -3.048** -4.698*** -2.7929*** -4.634** 
  (0.7408) (1.783) (1.783) (0.8927) (0.8119) (1.4391) (1.417) (0.996) (0.8027) (2.084) 
N of clusters 16 18 16 16 15 16 15 15 16 18 
Pseudo R2 0.211 0.3097 0.211 0.222 0.2653 0.3553 0.2315 0.238 0.1591 0.1919 








The main aims of this work were to delve into the intriguing topic of informal institutions, and to 
investigate whether and to what extent they help a country to attract FDI. After overviewing 
informal institutions and their main effects on FDI inflows, and reviewing recent empirical papers 
dealing with this issue, a simple meta-analysis was conducted based on the information extracted 
from the regression models of a selection of relevant studies.  
The main conclusions that can be drawn from the present work are as follows: (i) according to 
most of the empirical literature reviewed, informal institutions matter for inward FDI; (ii) A broad 
array of values typically in favor of FDI and solid social networks of individuals and firms tend to 
significantly attract foreign investors; (iii) the role played by informal institutions in influencing 
FDI seems especially relevant for developing economies.  
The first result suggests that researchers should try to include indicators of informal institutions as 
well when analyzing the effect of a country’s institutional framework on its inward FDI or other 
economic variables. Moreover, the managers of foreign firms and policymakers in the host 
countries should both take these factors into account. In particular, as suggested by the second 
main finding, they should commit to fighting corruption and promoting collaborative, trust-based 
relationships between local firms, also by involving the foreign companies.  In turn, the investor 
company managers should make an effort to be trustworthy and to become more integrated in the 
local society, to understand and respect the values and customs prevailing in the host country, and 
to join local business networks. Both parties should benefit from their respective efforts. Finally, 
according to the third conclusion, these recommendations matter in particular for developing 
countries, where informal institutions may partially compensate for poor official regulatory 
systems and governances. In addition, informal institutions may increase the FDI attractiveness of 
these countries, in which they can stimulate economic growth, job creation and modernization.   
Hence, despite the limitations briefly illustrated at the end of section 2.5, the present study may 
offer some interesting insights. Moreover, more and more studies on these topics are rapidly 
becoming available, so future meta-analyses are expected to draw on more observations and 
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Table A.2.1 The primary studies and the variables included in the meta-analysis 
 
id author IF5 FWCI SIGNIF POS_SIG NEG_SIG VAL_NEG ILL VALPOS_REL FORM_INS DEV_EC PREV_DEV PAN NOT_LIN NUM_OBS 
1 Alemu  0.32 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 240 
1 Alemu  0.32 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 240 
























7.692 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 222 
4 Helmy  0.965 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 96 
4 Helmy  0.965 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 50 
4 Helmy  0.965 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 44 
4 Helmy  0.965 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 96 
4 Helmy  0.965 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 63 
4 Helmy  0.965 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 19 
4 Helmy  0.965 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 63 
4 Helmy  0.965 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 96 
4 Helmy  0.965 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 50 
4 Helmy  0.965 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 33 
5 Holmes et al.  9.238 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 450 
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5 Holmes et al.  9.238 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 450 
6 Jalil et al. 0.867 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 551 
6 Jalil et al. 0.867 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 377 
6 Jalil et al. 0.867 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 290 
6 Jalil et al. 0.867 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1218 
6 Jalil et al. 0.867 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 377 
6 Jalil et al. 0.867 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 290 
6 Jalil et al. 0.867 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 377 
6 Jalil et al. 0.867 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 290 
6 Jalil et al. 0.867 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 551 
6 Jalil et al. 0.867 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1218 
6 Jalil et al. 0.867 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 551 
























0.242 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 5481 
8 Lee & Park  0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 300 
8 Lee &Park  0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 300 
8 Lee & Park  0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 45 
8 Lee & Park  0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 67 
8 Lee & Park  0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 553 
8 Lee  & Park  0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 553 
8 Lee & Park  0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 45 










2.5 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 220 
10 
Meon & 
Sekkat   
1.695 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 199 
10 
Meon & 
Sekkat   
























2.608 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 36504 
12 Quazi  0.957 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 161 
12 Quazi  0.957 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 161 
12 Quazi  0.957 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 161 
12 Quazi  0.957 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 161 
12 Quazi  0.957 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 161 
12 Quazi  0.957 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 161 
12 Quazi  0.957 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 125 
13 Sekkat 0.425 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 57 
13 Sekkat 0.425 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 83 
13 Sekkat 0.425 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 97 
13 Sekkat 0.425 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 77 
14 Seyoum  0.569 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 107 
15 
Smarzynska & 
Wei    
0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 6320 
15 
Smarzynska & 
Wei    
0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 6320 
15 
Smarzynska & 
Wei    
0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 6320 
16 Wang  0.525 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 22 
16 Wang  0.525 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 71 
16 Wang  0.525 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 49 
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17 Wu et al.  1.798 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 40 
17 Wu et al.  1.798 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 40 
18 Zhao & Kim 1.07 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 76 
18 Zhao & Kim 1.07 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 76 
18 Zhao & Kim 1.07 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 76 
18 Zhao & Kim 1.07 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 76 
 
Note: this table reports the values taken on also by the variable NEG_SIG and DEV_EC, which are not used in the regression estimates: in Table 2 I did not show the regression results for the dependent 
variable NEG_SIG since the main aim of this work is to better understand whether at least some types of informal institution attract inward FDI; moreover, the related results are quite symmetric with 
respect to the results obtained by using POS_SIG as dependent variable (namely, VAL_REL is significantly negative while VAL_NEG is significantly positive). With regard to DEV_EC, as I stated in 












Table  A.2.2  Summary statistics of the variables included in the meta-analysis 
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Table A.2.3   Pairwise correlations between the regression of the meta-analysis 
 




























































































































































































































































Chapter 3. Does inward FDI affect the quality of domestic institutions? 




Domestic institutions are recognized as important factors for attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) and 
spurring economic development in host countries. However, FDI as well can affect and shape domestic 
institutions. Despite an increasing interest in the influence of FDI, most of the existing empirical studies 
focus on only one or few institutions at a time. In this paper we use extensive data on the quality of 
institutions and on inward FDI for 127 countries and 22 years to assess whether attracting FDI increases 
the quality of institutions in the host economies. In doing so, we distinguish between different types of 
institution, FDI and countries and we estimate a series of pooled OLS, fixed effects and dynamic panel data 
models to address endogeneity. Our findings suggest that a higher amount of inward FDI increases the 
average quality of institutions in the country of destination. This particularly holds when institutional 
quality is measured in terms of political stability, regulatory quality and rule of law, and when the host 
country is a developing economy.   
  
 
Keywords: quality of institutions, foreign direct investment, panel data 








3.1 Introduction  
 
In the last two decades, the literature in international economics and international business has 
largely explored the determinants of inward foreign direct investment (FDI) and has acknowledged 
the relevance of host country’s institutions8. Although most of the literature has focused on the 
influence of institutions on inward FDI (see Bailey, 2018 and Mondolo, 2018 for a review), 
institutions are unlikely to be exogenous to multinational enterprises’ (MNEs)9 strategies and then, 
to FDI. Indeed, foreign firms generally attempt to adapt to the local institutional conditions in order 
to overcome the “liability of foreignness” and to obtain legitimacy in the host markets (Kostova, 
1999; Dahan et al., 2006). Moreover, they typically try to shape the local business environment in 
their favour (Boddewyn, 1988; Hillman & Hitt, 1999). At the same time, the countries that are 
sensitive to the benefits of inward FDI, and that commit to gaining legitimacy and international 
reputation within the bigger, global business community, voluntarily adopt policies aimed at 
attracting foreign investment (Martin & Mc Kibbin, 1999; Kwok & Tadesse, 2006). The reason 
why and the extent to which national governments are willing to modify their institutions or 
policies, either to affect the behaviour of MNEs, or as a result of their increasing presence in the 
global economy, can be explained by considering Dunning’s eclectic paradigm10. According to 
this approach, the probability that the domestic government implements this type of initiatives is 
a positive function, ceteris paribus, of the number of distinctive ownership-specific advantages of 
MNEs and of their ability to augment or combine these assets with the local resources and 
competences. In addition, this probability increases with the attractiveness of the country’s own 
                                                          
8 We adopted Hodgson’s definition of institutions. According to him, institutions are “the systems of established and embedded 
social rules that structure social interactions” (Hodgson, 2006, p.13). Property rights, rule of law, corruption and political rights 
are typically considered as examples of institutions. This work focuses on the so-called formal institutions, namely those institutions 
that are founded on codified and explicit rules and standards and that shape the interaction between members of society by 
promoting stability and regulation (North, 1990; Scott, 2008a).  
 
9 Unless otherwise specified, we use the terms multinational enterprises (or MNEs), foreign firms, foreign investors and 
multinational firms or companies interchangeably, to refer to foreign multinational firms (namely, the companies that undertake a 
FDI in another country).  
 
10 Dunning’s eclectic or OLI paradigm is one of the most popular frameworks used to explain the factors that induce a firm to 
become a multinational. See Dunning (2000) for a review. 
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location-specific assets to inward investors, and also with the competition between MNEs for the 
host country’s resources, capabilities or markets (Dunning & Lundan, 2008a).  
As a matter of fact, in the last twenty years or so, a growing number of empirical studies have 
investigated what Kwok & Tadesse (2006, p. 767) define “the other side of the picture” in the 
relationship between inward FDI and institutions. However, this issue is still under-researched, 
and the existing works focus on one institutional factor or policy at a time, such as corruption or 
environmental regulation, on a relatively small sample of countries, and/or on a narrow time frame.  
Thus, the present study aims to provide a more global picture of the effects of inward FDI on 
domestic institutional quality and of the relationship between inward FDI and institutions, which 
is likely to be mutual. More specifically, it intends to understand: whether, beyond pursuing their 
own interests, MNEs may exert a positive influence on the host country; whether inward FDI is a 
driver of institutional change, which can be in turn a driver of economic development, in transition 
and developing economies; how different institutional dimensions are affected by increasing 
amounts of FDI. To this purpose, this work merges data from different data sources on a sample 
of 127 countries and 22 years, and assesses the influence of inward FDI both on the overall quality 
of institutions of the host country and on its main components. Moreover, it distinguishes: (i) 
countries on the basis of their level of development; (ii) general real yearly financial inflows with 
respect to FDI inflows as a share of GDP and yearly number of greenfield FDI projects; (iii) the 
quality of institutions along six dimensions: voice and accountability, political stability, 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption. Further, it 
adopts different econometric techniques, including a dynamic panel approach in order to address 
the potential endogeneity affecting the relationship between FDI and the quality of institutions.  
We find that attracting FDI has a positive impact on the average quality of domestic institutions. 
In particular, this effect is stronger when: (i) institutions are measured in terms of political stability, 
government effectiveness and, in particular, regulatory quality and rule of law; (ii) the recipient 
country is a developing economy and, to a lesser extent, a transition economy; especially in the 
latter areas, when FDI is measured as the number of greenfield projects. These results are robust 
to unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneity and to alternative measures of institutional quality. 
Therefore, we posit that FDI attraction may act as a policy device which can help developing 
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regions to increase the quality of their institutional setting, and their level of economic 
development.  
The balance of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the conceptual framework, 
showing the mechanisms through which MNEs affect domestic institutions (3.2.1) and reviewing 
the literature on the effects of inward FDI on some specific types of institution (3.2.2). Section 3.3 
describes the empirical model and the data. Section 3.4 presents the estimation results, and section 
3.5 concludes.  
 
3.2 Conceptual framework 
3.2.1 The main mechanisms through which MNEs may affect domestic institutions 
In recent decades, the literature has increasingly acknowledged the role of multinational 
companies, and consequently of inward FDI, in affecting the institutional framework of the host 
country, to the point that MNEs have been sometimes defined as “agents of change” (Kwok & 
Tadesse, 2006; Neffke et al., 2018) “agents of economic transition” (Malesky, 2009) and 
“institutional entrepreneurs” (DiMaggio, 1988; Dahan et al., 2006).  
Multinational firms are typically able to shape the local business environment because they 
generally hold a higher level of political influence, namely, they hold more political power over 
public officials, than non-multinational domestic firms. This condition is due to two main 
elements: the host country’s belief that the firm will contribute to economic growth, which 
increases the multinational company’s bargaining power to negotiate favorable entry conditions in 
the host market; the international dimension of the multinational enterprise, which implies lower 
moving costs in another country (Desbordes & Vaudey, 2007), the knowledge of sophisticated 
market rules, the possibility to adopt transfer pricing schemes and benefit from subsidies not 
available to local firms (Ramirez & Kwok, 2009), and typically, also a greater experience in 
managing institutional idiosyncracies (Henisz, 2003). Thus, MNEs often resort to lobbying in 
order to influence some governmental policies that matter for their activities, such as regulations 
about trade protection and local environment (see section 3.2.2), or taxation.  
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However, foreign investors may also foster the local institutional development by providing 
information on laws used in other destination countries, by actively collaborating with local actors 
in the provision of services (see section 3.2.2) or, as pointed out by Dahan et al. (2006), by creating 
or participating in policy networks within transnational social and economic systems. The authors 
define a policy network as a “self-organizing group that coordinates a growing number of public 
(decision-makers) and private (interest groups) actors for the purpose of formulating and 
implementing public policies” (Dahan et al., 2006, p.1578), and they also report several examples 
of international organizations which can be considered as policy networks (e.g. the Transatlantic 
Business Dialogue, the World Commission on Social Dimensions of Globalization, and the Global 
Climate Change Coalition).  
Generally, multinational firms also exert a more indirect influence on the local environment. In 
particular, starting from the analysis of the concepts of institutional isomorphism and of 
disembeddedness11, (see DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, and Dacin et al., 1999), Kwok & Tadesse 
(2006) identify three main processes through which MNEs can affect the host country, mainly 
through their impact on domestic firms and on local workers hired by foreign companies: (i) the 
regulatory pressure effect, (ii) the demonstration effect, and (iii) the professionalization effect. The 
regulatory pressure effect exists because the subsidiaries are exposed to political and economic 
pressures exerted by the host country, by the home country and by the international business 
community, where the latter tends to delegitimize illegal activities and introduces compulsory 
requirements and norms of conduct (Sandholtz & Gray, 2003; Kwok & Tadesse, 2006). For 
instance, the regulatory pressure effect can make the foreign companies’ employees more reluctant 
to offer bribes and then, contribute to discourage corruption. In addition, foreign firms may 
demonstrate to domestic firms how to conduct business in a different and maybe more efficient, 
effective and transparent way. This demonstration effect is fueled by the spread of the MNEs’ 
standardized business procedures and corporate life across the world, which tend to substitute the 
local firm’s existing organization patterns (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). For this reason, Westney 
(1993) states that these local organization patterns undergo a process of de-institutionalization. 
                                                          
11 Starting from the concept of “embeddedness of organizations”, Dacin et al. (1999) argue that globalization may be regarded as 
a disembedding process that strips individuals and firms from their local structures and allows for restructuring at a more global 
level. A concept related to disembeddednes,s which helps understand firms’ behavior, is that of institutional isomorphism proposed 
by DiMaggio & Powell (1983). According to them, organizations tend to take into account and to imitate the behaviour of other 
organizations that face a similar set of environmental conditions. 
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Historical examples include the transfer of US management models and incentive structures from 
the US to Europe in the fifties and sixties, and the transplantation of Japanese work practices and 
quality control procedures into the US and Europe in the eighties (Dunning & Lundan, 2008a).  
Finally, the professionalization effect is due to the ability of MNEs, which typically rely on cutting-
edge technologies and more advanced managerial techniques, and offer better working conditions 
and salaries, to attract young, talented workers. In order to increase their chance of being recruited, 
some of them attend business schools, obtain international certifications and join professional 
associations. In doing so, not only do these young people gain professional skills, but they also 
become increasingly open-minded and reluctant towards more obsolete ways of doing business 
and conservative values. Thus, they can contribute to gradually update the business culture of their 
country, which, over time, may shape personal values, human motivation and the social 
organization of production (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Kwok & Tadesse, 2006).  
 
3.2.2 The effects of inward FDI on host countries’ institutions: literature review 
The mechanisms outlined in section 3.2.1 help understand why and how MNEs’ inward FDI can 
affect different aspects of the domestic institutional environment. This section briefly reviews the 
literature concerned with this issue, focusing in particular on the effect of FDI on corruption, on 
government policies and on international relations. More detailed information on a selection of 
papers mentioned throughout the present paragraph is contained in Table 3.1. This table allows to 
easily analyse and compare these studies in terms of selected dependent variable and FDI 
regressor, subject and time frame, possible use of an econometric method which accounts for 
endogeneity, significance and direction of the effect of FDI on the institution taken into account 
and main conclusions. Sections from 3.2.2.1 to 3.2.2.4 briefly illustrate the effects of inward FDI 
on some types of institution outlined by the literature, while section 3.2.2.5 introduces the issue of 
sector heterogeneity.  
 




3.2.2.1 FDI and corruption  
Several researchers have investigated the impact of inward FDI on corruption, which, broadly 
speaking, can be defined as“the use of public office for private gains”, (Bardhan, 1997, p. 1321). 
According to Kwok & Tadesse (2006), by means of the demonstration effect, and in particular of 
the regulatory pressure effect, increasing inward FDI negatively affects the host country’s level of 
corruption over time. The authors’ quantitative analysis, conducted on a large sample of countries 
over thirty years, provides empirical support to this hypothesis.  
However, whether higher levels of inward FDI discourages or stimulates corruption is a highly 
debated topic. Indeed, on the one hand, FDI may reduce the propensity of a country to engaging 
in illegal activities because foreign investors who are corruption-averse, such as, as suggested by 
Wei (2000a), most of the American and European investors, can exit the market quite easily. 
Moreover, countries that are more integrated into the international society and in which FDI is 
important for the local economy are more exposed to economic and normative pressures against 
corruption (Sandholtz & Gray, 2003; Larrain B. & Tavares, 2004). In particular, with the 
introduction of the OECD anti-bribery Convention, foreign firms from OECD countries are 
increasingly likely to resort to legal lobbying activities (Desbordes & Vauday, 2007). In addition, 
as suggested by the demonstration effect, inward FDI, especially from developed countries 
characterized by more solid and transparent institutions, may promote the diffusion of pro-business 
norms and inject new values and ideas. In doing so, they favour the adoption of good governance 
practices and the strengthening of property rights protection and rule of law, while discouraging 
illegal activities (Gerring & Tacker, 2005; Lee & Lio, 2016). Finally, corruption has a disincentive 
effect on investment in general, since it increases the risk and uncertainty faced by potential 
investors and raises the costs of doing business (Getz & Volkema, 2001; Robertson & Watson, 
2004). In particular, as put forward by Rose-Ackerman (1975), corruption may be less frequent if 
it has long-term negative consequences to the firms and individuals involved, as is the case with 
FDI projects.  
On the other hand, FDI is likely to be vulnerable to corrupt activities since it is typically associated 
with large infrastructure projects and privatization programs which involve considerable economic 
rents. This vulnerability is generally higher in lax regulatory frameworks, discretionary decision-
making and imperfectly accountable public officials, in which it is more likely that foreign 
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investors conform to the local culture and the local business practices, including illegal activities 
(Larrain B. & Tavares, 2004; Lee & Lio, 2016). Further, the eagerness of foreign investors to enter 
the market may tempt the host-country nationals to resort to corruption as a means of sharing with 
the investors the local opportunities for profit offered by their own country (Robertson & Watson, 
2004). Finally, multinational firms, which can rely on advanced knowledge in international 
business and a vast international network, may have developed sophisticated bribery schemes 
which could “import” into the host countries (Kwok & Tadesse, 2006). Pinto & Zhu (2016), who 
assess the influence of inward FDI on perception of corruption in 95 countries for the years 2000-
2004, contend that whether FDI has a positive or negative effect on corruption mainly depends on 
the host country’s economic and political conditions and on the availability of local resources. 
Rather, Bayar (2011), who investigates 10 countries belonging either to Eurasia or to East-Asia, 
finds out that FDI is not a significant determinant of corruption in this geographical area. 
Finally, another relevant issue concerning FDI and corruption is endogeneity. Thus, most of the 
empirical papers that study the influence of FDI on corruption take endogeneity into account, for 
instance by resorting to an IV approach. In particular, the work by Craigwell & Wright (2011) 
mainly aims to understand which direction prevails and, to this purpose, it performs linear and 
non-linear Granger causality tests. According to the linear panel methods, the majority of the 
markets show a bidirectional causal link between FDI and corruption whereas, when nonlinear 
tests are used, the link from FDI to corruption dominates. 
 
3.2.2.2 FDI and government policies  
Foreign firms generally attempt to affect some host government policies, as the profitability of 
their FDI largely depends on the business environment in which they operate. Such corporate 
political strategy has been mostly investigated by the endogenous protection literature (Desbordes 
& Vaudey, 2007). Indeed, MNEs may influence the level of trade protection by undertaking “quid 
pro quo” direct investments, which alleviate protectionist pressures, and also by lobbying (see for 
instance: Bhagwati et al., 1992; Grossman & Helpman, 1996; Blonigen & Figlio, 1998; Gawande 
et al., 2006). Moreover, FDI is found to affect the local environment regulation. However, whether 
it is beneficial or detrimental in this regard has long been object of debate. According to a widely 
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held view, mostly known as the “Pollution Haven hypothesis”, pollution-intensive firms tend to 
open subsidiaries in countries with less stringent environmental regulations. On the other hand, 
according to the so-called “Trade-Up hypothesis”, which has gained relevance more recently, FDI 
may contribute to the improvement of local environment protection. Specifically, it suggests that 
international integration provides developing countries with an opportunity to learn advanced 
environmental technologies, standards and management systems and with incentives to adopt them 
(Lin et al., 2014). For instance, Zeng & Eastin (2012) come to the conclusion that multinational 
firms from the least developed countries find it increasing financially advantageous to signal to 
consumers, investors, and potential business partners their commitment to environmental 
protection by adopting sound environmental practices; then, according to these authors’ empirical 
analysis, FDI form these countries can positively affect the local environment protection. Whether 
the “Pollution Haven hypothesis” or the “Trade-Up hypothesis dominates depends on the 
characteristics of the home and host countries and of the firms involved. In particular, Cole et al. 
(2006) suggest that inward FDI has a positive impact on the stringency of environmental 
regulations when the level of local government's corruptibility is low; rather, at higher levels of 
corruptibility this impact is lessened, and eventually becomes negative. 
Beyond pursuing their own interests, at times MNEs multinational firms collaborate with domestic 
enterprises with the aim of strengthening and upgrading the quality of local services, such as the 
local human resource training (see for instance Rasiah, 2002, and Okada, 2004). As an illustration, 
Wrana & Revilla-Diez (2016) find out that MNEs carrying out cooperation projects with local 
schools in Vietnam can positively influence the quality of local education by introducing 
institutional elements of their home country’s skill formation system. Moreover, as observed by 
Dunning & Lundan (2008a), the upgrading of local vocational training also allows the 
multinational firms to inject and disseminate business culture in the host country.  
 
3.2.2.3 FDI and international relations 
Inward FDI may also better the international relations between the home country and the host 
country. Indeed, FDI can improve their bilateral political relations and increase their economic 
interdependence, thus, making military conflicts, which would cause a loss of many of the gains 
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deriving from FDI for both the home and the host country, more costly.  Hence, FDI can even act 
as a détente of military tensions (Russett & Oneal, 2001; Kahler & Kastner, 2006; Levy, 2003; 
Gartzke et al., 2001). An important empirical contribution to this strand of literature is provided 
by Polacheck et al. (2012). By employing bilateral FDI for a total of 53 countries, they find that a 
10% increase in FDI is associated with an increase in net cooperation of 3.3%. An interesting case 
study is offered in this regard by what is often considered the most centralized economy of the 
world, North Korea. Indeed, in 2004 this country opened a special economic zone (the Gaeseong 
Industrial Complex, or GIC) that attracts investments from other countries, and especially from 
South Korea (Kim, 2016). The GIC could act as a conflict management tool which helps reduce 
the military tensions between these two countries by increasing their economic interdependence 
(Haggard & Noland, 2008), but also by influencing the opinion of North Korean people towards 
South Korea (Yang et al., 2013). Moreover, in the long term, the GIC could motivate North Korea 
to undertake a transformation process from a totally planned economy to a more open and market-
oriented one (Lee & Lee, 2013; Kim, 2016).  
 
3.2.2.4 FDI and other institutional factors 
Increasing inward FDI and integration in the world economy may also lead to de facto 
decentralization. Indeed, they can provide subnational actors with resource flows which make 
them more independent from the central government authority and which strengthen the 
importance of subnational policies for economic development (Malesky, 2008). Evidence of this 
“empowerment of local leaders” effect has been found, for instance, in Kazakhstan (Jones-Luong, 
2003), Mexico (Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2003) and Vietnam (Malesky, 2008).  
Furthermore, FDI may contribute to ideological convergence across countries. In particular, Lin 
(2018), who uses data on extensive individual surveys administered in 28 provinces of mainland 
China, claims that those who work in foreign-invested enterprises (especially non-Hong Kong, 
Macao and Taiwan invested enterprises) tend to be more in favour of freedom of speech than 
individuals who work in domestic firms. According to Kim (2016), a gradual ideological 
convergence, also triggered by the workers of the two countries who work side by side in the GIC, 
could happen in the long-term also between the two Koreas (see section 3.2.2.3).  
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3.2.2.5 Inward FDI and institutions across different sectors 
Almost all the studies addressing the effect of inward FDI on some institutions and policies do not 
investigate whether this impact varies across different industries, maybe also due to the limited 
availability of disaggregated data for certain countries and time horizons. In this regard, Zeng & 
Eastin (2012, p. 2230), in the conclusive section of their study focusing on the impact of FDI 
coming from developing countries on corporate environmental behavior, posit that, since the scope 
of their paper does not allow them to engage in detailed examination of FDI concerning different 
industries or market segments, they “leave these questions to future research”. Rather, Malesky 
(2009), who derives his data on inward FDI from the Vienna Institute for International Economic 
Studies (WIIW) dataset (which provides detailed data, also decomposed by country of origin and 
sector, for 22 countries of the Eurasian region), shows that there is a positive effect of FDI on 
reform progress in 27 transition economies. Notably, this positive relationship is particularly 
strong in the service and in the manufacturing sectors, with the exception, for the latter, of 
construction and utility-based projects, while it does not hold for natural resource-based projects. 
Actually, according to the author, access to resources and bidding for construction and utilities 
projects may force some investors, who are mainly interested in the policies favouring their 
business, to lobby against general economic reform. Similar considerations are likely to hold also 
for other activities included in the primary sector, such as mineral extraction and mining. 
Interestingly, a number of papers that investigate the relevance of good institutional quality for 
foreign investors in different sectors (e.g. Ali et al., 2010; Walsh & Yu, 2010; Tintin, 2013) find 
that institutional quality is a robust determinant of FDI in the services and the manufacturing 
sectors but not of FDI concerning the primary sector, the latter being natural-resource seeking 
investments. Thus, it seems that there is not a significant mutual relationship between inward FDI 
and institutional quality when the primary industry only is taken into account. However, it is worth 
mentioning that the value added of the primary sector, in recent years, represents a small portion 
of GDP not only in the advanced countries, but also in developing and transition economies. 
Conversely, the service sector has been gaining relevance, to the point that in 2016 it accounted 
for 66 % of the total value added in the advanced countries, 64 % in the developing countries and 
70 % in the transition economies. Moreover, the value of estimated global inward FDI stocks in 
the service sector, which in 2001 equaled 4 trillions of dollars, amounted to 16 trillions of dollars 
in 2015, compared to 2 trillions of dollars of the primary sector in the same year (UNCTAD, 2017). 
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3.2.3 The impact of inward FDI on institutions: research hypothesis  
From the review of the studies presented in Table 3.1, it can be noticed that the results concerning 
the effect of corruption on FDI are quite mixed, while all the other studies find a positive effect of 
FDI on the type of institution taken into account. Moreover, by means of the mechanisms outlined 
in section 3.2.1, some authors posit that MNEs can favour the adoption of more advanced business 
practices and more liberal values, and encourage the local authorities to undertake processes of 
modernization, decentralization and liberalization, and to address the weaknesses of their 
institutional framework. Thus, beyond affecting the business practices and decision-making 
processes of the local markets’ authorities to their advantage, foreign multinational firms can also 
trigger a positive, gradual progress of conformation of the host country to higher standards of 
governance and regulation (Hewko, 2002; Malesky, 2009). For these reasons, although its impact 
on corruption is ambiguous, FDI is likely to have a positive influence also on the overall quality 
of governance and institutions of the host country.  
In addition, looking at the reviewed studies, it can be observed that their samples predominantly 
include developing and/or transition economies. Hence, it seems that the way and the extent to 
which FDI affects these countries is of particular interest. Actually, developing and, in particular, 
transition countries are undertaking process of catch-up and modernization and have more scope 
to improve their institutional quality than advanced economies. In addition, these countries often 
rely on a more malleable institutional framework. At the same time, foreign investors, especially 
in transition economies such as the post-communist countries, generally do not settle for a passive 
role in the host country’s reform process, but work closely with government actors (Malesky, 
2009). In doing so, they can promote more advanced business practises, favour the strengthening 
of property rights protection and rule of law, which in these countries are generally under-
developed, and help improve the quality of public services (such as vocational training in 
Vietnam). Finally, as contended in section 3.2.2.4, FDI can favour de-centralization processes in 
countries dealing with an unequal distribution of political power and low levels of democracy, 
which are generally transition or developing economies (such as the three countries mentioned in 
section 3.2.2.4).  
In the light of these considerations, first, we do expect increasing FDI to have a positive impact on 
the average quality of domestic institutions. Second, we do suppose that developing and transition 
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economies are more affected by inward FDI than developed countries, from which these 
investments mostly originate.12 Third, we do expect this effect of inward FDI to vary according to 
the type of institutional aspect taken into account.  
 
3.3  Empirical analysis 
 
3.3.1 Data 
Our sample consists of 127 countries (see the Appendix, Table A.3.1, for the full list), which are 
observed over a 22-year period, from 1995 to 2016. The time frame restricts to 2003-2016 when 
the amount of inward FDI is proxied by the number of greenfield FDI, because the corresponding 
data are not available before 2003. The countries are then split into three main groups, according 
to their level of development13: advanced countries, developing countries and transition 
economies. We merge information from different data sources (see the Appendix, Table A.3.2 for 
the full list of variables and related sources).  
 
3.3.1.1 Dependent variable 
The dependent variable is the “quality of governance index” (QGOV), which is the average of the 
six Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) developed by Daniel Kaufmann and Aart Kraay and 
made available by the World Bank Group. Despite some critiques (e.g. Arndt & Oman, 2006; 
Knack, 2006), most of which refuted by Kaufmann et al. (2007), these indicators are highly 
                                                          
12 In recent years, there has been a remarkable increase of outward FDI from some highly-dynamic developing 
countries od South-East Asia, namely Singapore, Hong Kong and, primarily, China. As an illustration, in 2015, this 
country represented the biggest investor in the Developing Asia region and the fourth main investor in Africa 
(UNCTAD, 2018). However, this phenomenon is quite recent, and if we consider the whole 22-year time frame (from 
1995 to 2016) adopted in this work, it emerges that most of FDI realized in those years in developing and transition 
economies come from developed countries.   
 
13 We split the sample following the United Nation classification, with the exception of the Eastern European countries 
currently belonging to the UE (i.e. Slovenia, Slovakia, Hungary, Czech Republic, Poland, Croatia, Lithuania, Latvia, 
Estonia, Romania and Bulgaria), which, in line with the economics of transition literature, are classified as transition 




acknowledged and widely employed. They are based on a broad definition of governance. 
Specifically, Kaufmann et al. (2011, p. 222) identify governance with“the traditions and 
institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes (a) the process by which 
governments are selected, monitored and replaced; (b) the capacity of the government to 
effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and (c) the respect of citizens and the state for 
the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them”. Therefore, QGOV 
may be a good proxy for the overall quality of institutions of a country. The six WGI, which range 
from about -2.5 (the lowest quality) to +2.5 (the best quality) and are available for most of the 
world from 1996, concern the following complementary governance dimensions:   
- voice and accountability, which captures perceptions of the extent to which citizens are able to 
participate in the selection of their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of 
association, and free press and media;  
- political stability and absence of violence/terrorism, which is related to perceptions of the 
likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent 
means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism; 
- government effectiveness, capturing perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of 
the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such 
policies; 
-regulatory quality, concerning perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development and 
market-oriented strategies; 
- rule of law, which reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide 
by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the 
police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence; 
- control of corruption, capturing perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for 
private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state 
by elites and private interests. 
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The WGI condense information from a wide set of perception-based governance data sources (e.g. 
the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report, the Institute for Management 
Development’s World Competitiveness Yearbook and the World Bank/EBRD’s Business 
Environment and Enterprise Performance surveys) and measure several relevant types of 
institution, such as civil liberties, political rights and freedom of press, property rights, rule of law 
and corruption (World Bank Group, 2018).  
In addition, we use each of the six aforementioned components of QGOV as dependent variable 
in order to understand how inward FDI affects different institutional dimensions.  
Finally, as robustness check (see section 3.4.4), we employ the index of Economic Freedom 
provided by Heritage Foundation. Although the latter mainly focuses on economic institutions, it 
covers a wide range of institutional aspects too, and partially overlaps with some of the WGI. More 
specifically,this broad index, which ranges from 0 (lack of economic freedom) to 100 (full 
economic freedom) is based on 10 indicators, namely property rights, freedom from corruption, 
fiscal freedom, government spending, business freedom, labour freedom, monetary freedom, trade 
freedom, investment freedom and financial freedom (Heritage Foundation, 2018).  
Figure 3.1 shows the trend of QGOV between 1995 and 2016 for all the countries in our sample 
and for the sub-samples of developing economies and of transition economies.   
 
FIGURE 3.1 HERE 
 
Across all the countries, we observe that the level of the institutional quality index remains quite 
stable over time, although, during the first years of the new millennium, it slightly decreases as 
compared to the level recorded in the second half of the nineties. This result is mainly driven by 
the performance of the developing economies, which, during those years, experienced a worsening 
in the quality of their institutions, mainly determined by the fall of the level of political stability 
and regulatory quality. This lowering in their institutional quality has been followed by a gradual 
recovery, mainly driven by the South-East Asian region. On the other hand, the overall quality of 
institutions has remarkably improved over time in transition economies, which, from the beginning 
88 
 
of the nineties, have undertaken pervasive processes of modernization, privatization and 
democratization.  
 
3.3.1.2 Focal regressor: FDI  
We employed three different FDI variables. The first one refers to the amount of real net FDI 
inflows (RFDI) measured in millions of US dollars14. Data on yearly inward FDI flows at current 
prices come from UNCTAD FDI Statistics. We then use data on country’s GDP deflator from the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators Dataset to compute the yearly inward FDI flows in 
real terms. The second variable is FDI/GDP, and is given by FDI inflows as a share of national 
GDP: while RFDI provides a measure of the absolute amount of inward FDI, FDI/GDP provides 
a measure of the relevance of FDI inflows for the recipient country’s economy. Third, we include 
the number of inward greenfield projects (GRFDI). This variable is based on data from the FDI 
Markets Dataset developed by the Financial Time’s Group and from some Annex Tables provided 
by UNCTAD FDI Statistics. Differently from the other two variables, GRFDI considers the count 
of the physical investment projects that are undertaken by multinationals in host countries. Unlike 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A), which can just involve a simple change in 
ownership between firms, greenfield FDI are investment projects that entail the establishment of 
new assets and activities in the host country, and not simply a change in the ownership and control 
of a domestic company. (UNCTAD, 2009). Therefore, they may have a larger/additional impact 
on the domestic economic and institutional framework. Multinational companies typically prefer 
to undertake a greenfield FDI rather than a M&A in developing and transition economies because 
of a general lack of suitable domestic companies, and because in these areas the potential reverse 
flows of knowledge and technology from the host location to the country of origin are in general 
relatively low. This reduces the potential success of a M&A, which relies on significant bi-
directional flows between the acquiring and acquired organizations. Rather, the creation of new 
greenfield establishments in developing and transition economies allow MNEs, in particular from 
advanced countries, to organize, configure and control all the aspects of the production or service 
process (Iammarino & McCann, 2013).  
                                                          
14 The results do not remarkably change when FDI inflows at current prices are used. 
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Figure 3.2 shows the dynamics of FDI inflows between 1995 and 2016 across the entire sample, 
and, separately, for transition and developing economies. Looking at the whole sample, we observe 
that, since the mid-nineties, FDI inflows has increased considerably, except during the periods of 
the financial and sub-prime crises, i.e. 2008-09 and 2012-14 respectively. With regard to transition 
economies, this area attracted a relevant amount of FDI in particular from the mid-nineties until 
around 2008-2009. The contraction experienced in 2015 is mainly driven by the reduction of FDI 
in four large economies, namely Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan (also due to political 
uncertainty and military tensions in this area) and has been followed by a recovery, which, 
according to UNCTAD analysts, should continue in the next years (UNCTAD, 2018).    
 
3.3.1.3 Control variables 
When investigating the effect of inward FDI on institutions, we control for some macroeconomic 
factors of the host country that can potentially affect its institutional quality.  
Several researchers have acknowledged the role played by the country’s degree of economic 
development, which is often proxied by its GDP per capita, in influencing the quality of institutions 
and control for it in their empirical analysis. Indeed, as argued by Kaufmann et al. (2009), good 
governance and institutional quality require time and resources to develop, suggesting that richer 
countries or countries with greater human resources are more likely to experience a better quality 
of institutions. In line with these considerations, Alonso & Garcimartin (2013) posit that the level 
of economic development determines the availability of resources to build good institutions, and 
also that it generates a larger demand for quality institutions. Thus, we initially selected, among 
the controls, also the variable GDP per capita, which as expected was typically highly and 
positively significant. However, beyond generating concerns about its endogeneity with respect to 
institutional quality and also with the FDI variables, it was highly correlated with other controls. 
Accordingly, we eventually decided to drop it and to include other variables referring to socio-
economic characteristics of the host county.  
First, we control for country size, using total population (POP), and for population density 
(DENS), which typically provides also a measure of the degree of urbanization. The effects of 
these variables of institutional quality is ambiguous. Indeed, higher levels of population and of 
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population density may be positively influenced by reduced mortality rate, better medical facilities 
and immigration due to the presence of economic opportunities and then, it may reflect a certain 
degree of economic development, which, in turn, is expected to positively affect institutional 
quality. Moreover, as Lee & Lio (2016) suggest, a certain level of population density can help 
achieve economies of scale in the provision of public services. However, overpopulation can also 
create difficulties in the provision of public services and, more in general, in the management of 
the additional governance challenges of a highly populated country. Further, it may be driven by 
an average high number of children per woman, which is often associated with poverty and low 
levels of education, and therefore it may suggest the presence of lacking economic and especially 
of social development and have a negative influence on institutional quality.  
We also control for the industry mix of a country, including the value added of services (SERV) 
and that of industry (IND), as a share of domestic GDP (keeping the share of value added in 
primary sectors as the term of reference). In this way, we implicitly control for the level of 
development of a country, which should increase the higher the share of value added in service-
related activities. Rather, the influence of industrialization is more ambiguous since, as suggested 
by Lee & Lio (2016), it can create a large number of rent-seeking opportunities which may foster 
corruption.  
Then, we include a variable computed as the sum of exports and imports divided by domestic GDP 
(TRADE) as a proxy of trade openness, which is expected to have a positive effect on the latter 
for similar reasons to those that have already been discussed with regard to inward FDI. However, 
previous studies show that the influence of this indicator on institutional quality varies according 
to the type of institution taken into account, especially after controlling for development level, and 
according to the country sample used  (Islam & Montenegro, 2002; Knack & Azfar, 2003). In 
particular, Rigobon & Rodrik (2004) find a positive relationship, though weak, between trade 
openness and the rule of law, but a negative relationship between the former and democracy, which 
the authors interpret in terms of distributive tensions generated by economic openness.  
Moreover, we control for inflation (INFL), using the domestic GDP deflator, and for 
unemployment (UNEMP), as given by the share of total unemployment on total labour force, since 
they can lead to conflicts, socio-political instability and insecurity which ,in turn, can have a 
negative influence on the quality of institutions.  
91 
 
In addition, the quality of domestic institutions may increase with the availability of network 
infrastructures such as the telephone lines and internet, which can improve the governance 
efficiency and reduce costs and wastes, and also have a more indirect influence on institutional 
quality by capturing social and economic development. Thus, we also include a variable measuring 
total broadband and fixed telephone subscriptions per 100 people (BROADTEL). This indicator 
is likely to be strongly related also to education, whose positive effect on institutional quality has 
been highlighted by Alesina & Perotti (1996) and then highly recognized by several researchers 
(see Alonso & Garcimartin, 2013, for a review). As a matter of fact, BROADTEL is highly 
correlated with our selected proxy for education (namely, the average number of years of 
schooling, derived from the Human Development Index Dataset provided by the United Nations). 
In addition, two relevant aspects concerning education, namely the perceived quality of primary 
education and the coverage of primary school, are already captured by the WGI “Government 
effectiveness”, and thus by the dependent variable of our econometric model. These are likely to 
be the reasons why the coefficient of the variable “average number of years of schooling” is not 
significant in most of the regression estimates (available upon request). In the light of these 
considerations, we decided to drop it.  
Finally, we control for a series of dummies capturing country’s belonging to specific political and 
commercial areas, or being member of trade agreements, which can ease the attraction of FDI and 
also have a positive influence on institutional quality by requiring  countries, or motivating them,  
to  make  important  adjustments  to various  laws  and  regulations (Lehne et al., 2014). Thus, we 
alternatively control for a country’s belonging to OECD and for a country’s adherence to the 
following set of international economic organizations and agreements: UEMOA (Union 
Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine) COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa) and/or CFTA (Continental Free Trade Area), SADC (Southern African Development 
Community), APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation), UNASUR (Union of South American 
Nations), CACM (Central American Common Market), NAFTA (North American Free Trade 
Agreement), ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), MERCOSUR (Mercado Común 





3.3.2 Econometric model 
We start estimating the following baseline model: 
 
𝑄𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2 𝑋𝑖𝑡 +  𝜃𝑡   +𝛿𝑅+ ∈𝑖𝑡                                                                        (1) 
                                                                                                                  
where 𝑄𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡 is the index capturing the quality of institutions of country i at year t, that is further 
decomposed into the following six elements: voice and accountability (V&A), political stability 
(POLST), government effectiveness (GOVEFF), regulatory quality (REGQ), rule of law (RLAW) 
and control of corruption (CORR). To make the interpretation of these institutional variables 
easier, we normalized them between 0 and 1 using the following transformation: [x-min(x)/max(x)-
min(x)]. We also transformed each of them in natural logarithm.  
The variable 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 is the amount of FDI inflows in country i at year t, that we distinguish in: real 
FDI inflows (RFDI), FDI inflows as a share of GDP (FDI/GDP) and number of inward greenfield 
projects (GRFDI). The vector 𝑋𝑖𝑡 includes the control variables, namely total resident population 
(POP), population density (DEN), trade openness (TRADE), inflation (INFL), unemployment 
(UNEMP), the share of value added in industry (IND) and service (SERV) sectors, and total 
broadband and fixed telephone subscriptions per 100 people (BROADTEL). Again, we transform 
each of these variables in natural logarithm, except inflation.  
Finally, we include a vector of year-specific dummies (θt), and a vector of region-specific dummies 
(δR), using the UN geo-scheme as reference. All the standard errors are clustered at country level. 
Table 3.2 provides the summary statistics and the correlation matrix for the continuous variables.  
 






To account for unobserved heterogeneity, we also estimate a panel model with fixed effects:  
 
𝑄𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽1𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2 𝑋𝑖𝑡 +  𝜇𝑖 +  𝜃𝑡   +  𝑢𝑖𝑡                                                                                    (2) 
 
where 𝜇𝑖  is the vector of time-invariant characteristics of country i and 𝑢𝑖𝑡  is the stochastic error 
term.  
However, we reasonably think that the quality of institutions at time t largely depends on its value 
at time t-1. Moreover, it is likely that not only does inward FDI influence institutions, but also that 
the latter affect FDI. Thus, to account for persistence of institutions and for potential simultaneity 
with inward FDI, we also resort to a linear dynamic panel approach using the system GMM 
estimator provided by Arellano & Bover (1995) and by Blundell & Bond (1998), who refine the 
Arellano & Bond (1991) approach.  
A system of two equations is then estimated, one in first differences and one in levels, the latter 
(equation 3) including area and time fixed effects: 
 
𝑄𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽1𝑄𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3 𝑋𝑖𝑡 +  𝜇𝑖 +  𝜃𝑡   +  +𝑢𝑖𝑡                  (3) 
                                                                                                 
      
where 𝑄𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡−1 is the institutional index of country i at year t-1.  
 
The instruments are used to form the moment conditions. Following Roodman (2009), we resort 
to a parsimonious specification which limits as much as possible the number of instruments in 
order to contain losses of efficiency. Moreover, for simplicity, we here consider only FDI as 
potentially endogenous with respect to institutional quality, whereas we take all the other 
regressors as exogenous. Thus, in the equation in levels, we instrument the FDI variable by the 
corresponding first difference at time t-1, which is supposed to be uncorrelated with the error term 
in levels. In the equation in first differences, we use one-year lagged values of the FDI in levels as 
instruments, which are supposed to be uncorrelated with the error term in first difference. We 
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estimate equation 3 using the two-step system GMM estimator, and we apply the Windmeijer’s 
correction to the variance-covariance matrix in order to have heteroscedasticity-robust standard 
errors. The estimation of the system GMM model requires the presence of first-order serial 
correlation in the first-differenced residuals but the absence of second-order serial correlation. We 
test for this using the Arellano-Bond test for serial correlation, and we also test for over-identifying 
restrictions in our model by performing the Sargan test. 
 
3.4 Results 
The following section reports the main results of our regression estimates. Since the focus of our 
analysis is the effect of inward FDI on institutional quality and since we already briefly illustrated 
the possible effects of our control variables in section 3.3.1.3, most of the comments to the results 
from Table 3.4 onwards mostly refer to the FDI variables.  
 
3.4.1 Full sample 
Tables 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 present, respectively, the pooled OLS, fixed effects and SYS-GMM 
estimates for the whole sample, using QGOV as dependent variable. Tables 3.6, 3.8 and 3.10 show 
the pooled OLS and fixed effects estimates for advanced, transition and developing countries 
respectively, while Tables 3.7, 3.9 and 3.11 show the SYS-GMM estimates for advanced, 
transition and developing countries respectively. Finally, Table 3.12 reports the pooled OLS, FE 
and GMM estimated coefficients of our three FDI variables, for transition and developing 
economies, using the six single dimensions of institutional quality as dependent variables.  
Looking at the pooled OLS estimates in Table 3.3, we observe that the estimated coefficients of 
all the three FDI variables are positive and statistically significant. In particular, we find that, 
ceteris paribus, a 10% increase in real FDI inflows is related to an average 0.1% increase in the 
institutional quality (Columns 1 and 2), while a 10% increase in FDI/GDP is related to an average 
0.12% increase in institutional quality (Columns 3 and 4). Columns 5 and 6 show that, ceteris 
paribus, a 10% increase in the number of inward greenfield FDI is associated with an average 
0.8% increase in the quality of institutions. To give an idea of the magnitude of these effects, it is 
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worth considering that, in the full sample of 127 countries, the mean annual growth rate of QGOV 
is -0.002, with a minimum value of -0.182 and a maximum value of 0.211, and the median is 0. 
An estimated coefficient of 0.012 is a value closed to the top 25th percentile of the distribution, 
while a coefficient of 0.08 belongs to the 1st percentile of the distribution. This suggests that 
increasing FDI, and in particular greenfield FDI, is related to a remarkable raise in the quality of 
domestic institutions. With regard to the controls, we find that higher levels of total population and 
of the inflation rate are related to a lower institutional quality, whereas the latter increases the 
higher the relevance of the tertiary sector in a country, the higher the share of people using the 
network infrastructures and when the country is member of the OECD. Conversely, TRADE is not 
statistically significant in Columns 1 to 5, maybe because its potential positive effects are already 
captured by the FDI regressor and by other controls that reflect the degree of economic 
development, and is negatively significant in Column 6. This latter result, which is partially 
counterintuitive and is found also in other estimates, may be due to the higher incidence of imports 
with respect to exports, the latter typically entering the regression with positive sign. Finally, to 
test for potential multicollinearity, we provide a VIF test for each specification: we find that the 
value of the mean test statistics is always lower than 5.  
 
TABLE 3.3 HERE 
 
Table 3.4 provides the fixed effects estimates of equation 215. Because of potential unobserved 
heterogeneity, the magnitude and the statistical significance of the coefficients of the FDI variables 
are lower than those found in the pooled OLS estimates. However, the fixed effects estimates still 
suggest that attracting FDI, and in particular greenfield projects, is positively related to an increase 
in the overall quality of institutions.  
 
                                                          
15 Although they are not time-invariant, the OECD and the various trade agreements dummies are dropped from the 
fixed effects estimates due to their low variability. However, results do not change if we include them in the estimates.  
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TABLE 3.4 HERE 
 
When we estimate equation 3 through the two-step SYS-GMM approach (Table 3.5), we still find 
a positive and significant coefficient for real FDI inflows and number of greenfield FDI. Although 
ln_FDI/GDP is not statistically significant, an alternative measure which also accounts for the 
dimension of the country and which is more stable over time, ln_FDI/POP (i.e. the natural 
logarithm of the amount of FDI inflows divided by total population) has a positive and significant 
coefficient. Since we control for endogeneity, we can posit that, ceteris paribus, an increase in 
inward FDI induces an increase in the quality of domestic institutions. Looking at the diagnostic 
tests, we observe that the LM test on the AR(1) and AR(2) confirm the presence of first-order 
serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, while the Sargan test confirms the validity of 
our instruments.  
Accordingly, these results are consistent with our first research hypothesis.  
 
TABLE 3.5 HERE 
 
3.4.2 Results for advanced, transition and developing economies 
We now turn the attention to the estimates by type of country, i.e. advanced, transition and 
developing. Tables 3.6 and 3.7 show, respectively, the pooled OLS, fixed effects and SYS-GMM16 
estimates for the group of advanced countries. We find that the estimated coefficients of our three 
FDI variables are either not statistically significant, or, where significant, with a low magnitude, 
with the exception of the system GMM estimate of ln_RFDI, which is highly significant. The lack 
of significance of ln_FDI/GDP  and of ln_GRFDI  is probably related to the fact  that, generally, 
these countries already rely on solid and efficient institutions, thus the marginal effect of increasing 
amounts of inward FDI on their institutional quality is positive but negligible. The significance of 
                                                          
16 Due to the limited amount of observations, we are not able to use the two-step estimator because, even with the most parsimonious 
version of the model, the variance-covariance matrix is never full-ranked. Therefore, we opt for the one-step estimator.  
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the regressor capturing real FDI inflows, which include also mergers & acquisitions, may be 
related to the fact that most of inward FDI in developed countries takes the form of M&A. With 
regard to the control variables, the negative sign of the variable ln_SERV, which, in line with our 
expectations, typically enters with positive sign, raises some concerns and may deserve further 
investigation.  
 
TABLE 3.6 HERE 
TABLE 3.7 HERE 
 
Table 3.8 and Table 3.9 present the estimates for transition economies. Columns 1-3 of Table 3.8 
show the pooled OLS estimates, where the estimated coefficients of our three FDI variables are 
positive, statistically significant and in line with those reported in Table 3.3 for the full sample. 
However, the fixed effects estimates reported in Columns 4-6 show that only the coefficient of 
ln_GRFDI remains statistically different from zero: specifically, ceteris paribus, a 10% increase 
in inward greenfield FDI in transition economies is related to an average 0.22% increase in 
institutional quality. This value lies between the top 25th percentile (0.019) and the top 10th 
percentile of the distribution of the QGOV growth rate in transition economies, and so it represents 
a relevant change. The SYS-GMM estimates in Table 3.9 confirm this result, and also show that a 
10% increase in ln_FDI/GDP induces, ceteris paribus, an average 0.04% increase in the overall 
quality of domestic institutions. Instead, the effect of real FDI remains not statistically different 
from zero.  
 
TABLE 3.8 HERE 
TABLE 3.9 HERE 
 
Tables 3.10 and 3.11 provide the estimates for developing countries. Interestingly, from Table 3.10 
we find that all the estimated coefficients of our FDI variables are positive and statistically 
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significant, and are higher than those related to transition economies (Table 3.8). The SYS-GMM 
estimates on Table 3.11 confirm these results, except for FDI/GDP17. More specifically, we find 
that, ceteris paribus, a 10% rise in greenfield FDI projects increases the quality of domestic 
institutions by an average 0.24%. Instead, the corresponding effect for real FDI inflows reduces to 
0.05%, a value closed to the median of the distribution. All together, these results confirm our 
expectations: FDI can be a driver of institutional quality, particularly in transition and developing 
regions and in the form of greenfield projects, which, in these areas, represent the most common 
type of FDI.   
 
TABLE 3.10 HERE 
TABLE 3.11 HERE 
 
3.4.3 Results by type of institution 
Tables 3.3 to 3.11 provide the estimation results when the dependent variable is the average quality 
of institutions. However, it is likely that FDI has a different impact on different types of institution. 
To test our third hypothesis, we assess the effect of FDI on the single WGI. Table 3.12 summarizes 
the pooled OLS, fixed effects and SYS-GMM estimated coefficients of the FDI variables for, 
respectively, transition economies and developing countries18, using each of the six main elements 
of the QGOV as dependent variable.  
 
TABLE 3.12 HERE 
 
                                                          
17 One possible explanation is that the share of FDI on GDP is larger in transition economies (mean value 4.6%) as compared to 
developing countries (mean value 3.8%). Rather, the coefficient of ln_FDI/POP is positive and highly significant.  
18 We did not report the summary of the estimates for the whole sample due to space constraints and because our focus is on 
transition and developing economies. As for the system GMM estimates, we found a positive and significant coefficient only for 
greenfield FDI using voice & accountability (p<0.05) and rule of law (p<0.1) as dependent variable.  
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We focus on the cases where the SYS-GMM estimates provide statistically significant results, and, 
in particular, on the cases where also the pooled OLS and fixed effects estimates provide 
statistically significant coefficients. From Columns 1-3 of Table 3.12 we note that, in transition 
economies, the impact of inward FDI is significantly relevant for improving domestic regulatory 
quality and rule of law (which concern institutional aspects that typically matter for firms, 
including foreign investors) and, to a lesser extent, for political stability and voice & 
accountability.  Instead, we do not find robust results for control of corruption. In this latter case, 
while the pooled OLS and fixed effects estimates identify a positive and statistically significant 
coefficient for ln_GRFDI, the SYS-GMM estimates show that this coefficient is not statistically 
different from zero. This can be due to a reverse causality effect, according to which FDI is 
attracted where corruption is lower.  
When looking at developing countries (Columns 4 to 6 of Table 12), we find that four out of six 
types of institution are significantly affected by inward FDI in each estimated model: political 
stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality and rule of law. Although ln_FDI/GDP is 
never statistically significant, the alternative measure ln_FDI/POP is significant for the four 
aforementioned institutional dimensions. Similarly to transition economies, we find that the SYS-
GMM estimates do not confirm the results coming from pooled OLS and fixed effects estimates 
with respect to inward FDI and control of corruption: again, this finding suggests that a higher 
perceived control of corruption is more a driver than a consequence of FDI attraction.  
These results are consistent with our hypothesis concerning the different effect of FDI on different 
institutional dimensions. In particular, inward FDI (mainly greenfield) impacts more on those 
types of institution that are linked to the functioning of market-based rules, the ease of doing 
business and the corporate climate, namely regulatory quality and rule of law, and also has a 
positive effect on political stability and government effectiveness (and on voice & accountability 
too, in the case of transition economies). Instead, the impact on corruption becomes not relevant 






3.4.4 Robustness checks 
Finally, we conducted some robustness checks. 
First, we used the index of Economic Freedom as an alternative proxy for the average quality of 
institutions. From the summary of the estimates for transition and developing economies (see 
Table 3.13), it emerges that also when we use an alternative measure for the quality of institutions,  
the latter is positively influenced by inward FDI, and in particular by greenfield FDI.  Moreover, 
as in the main model specification, the magnitude and the statistical significance of the FDI 
coefficients decrease when shifting from the pooled OLS to the FE and to the system GMM 
estimators.  
 
TABLE 3.13 HERE 
 
Then, we lagged all the regressors by, respectively, one, two and three years in the pooled OLS 
and in the FE estimates. Table 3.14 condenses the coefficients of the lagged FDI variables for 
transition and developing economies.  
 
TABLE 3.14 HERE 
 
Next, in order to assess whether the accumulation over time of inward FDI has a relevant effect on 
the quality of institutions, we created two other FDI variables, namely CUM_RFDI and 
CUM_GRFDI. In particular, we assessed the effect of inward real FDI flows that entered a country 
during the time-frame 1995-2005 on the quality of institutions in 2006, and the effect of real FDI 
inflows over the period 2006-2016 on the quality of institutions in 2016. Moreover, we 
investigated the impact of cumulative greenfield FDI related to the period 2003-2009 on the quality 
of institutions in 2010, and the impact of greenfield FDI established in the period 2010-2016 on 
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the quality of institutions in 201619.  Column 1 of Table 3.15 reports the OLS coefficients of these 
cumulative FDI regressors for the whole sample (expressed, as usual, in natural logarithm). All 
the estimated coefficients are positive and statistically significant. Although the use of cumulative 
FDI may reduce potential simultaneity, the latter cannot be excluded due to the high persistence 
of institutions over time. Since external instruments are not available and we deal with a cross-
section, in order to still account for potential simultaneity we resort to Lewbel’s (2012) approach, 
which exploits conditional second moments of the endogenous variables to account for 
endogeneity by circumventing the need for traditional instruments. Identification is based on a 
heteroscedastic covariance restriction, namely, on the presence of covariates that are correlated 
with the conditional variance of the first-stage errors, but not with the conditional covariance of 
heteroscedastic errors. Column 2 of Table 3.15 reports the estimated coefficients for cumulative 
real FDI inflows and for cumulative greenfield FDI obtained by using Lewbel’s (2012) method. 
The complete estimates, as well as the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic, which is an indicator 
of the weakness of the instruments (the higher this statistic, the stronger the instruments), and the 
p-value of the Hansen J test for overidentification can be found in Table A.3.3 in the Appendix. 
Since the cumulative FDI coefficients are all positive and highly significant, we can posit that 
higher amounts of cumulative FDI induce an increase in the quality of institutions.  
 
TABLE 3.15 HERE 
 
3.5 Conclusions  
In this paper we assess whether, and to what extent, inward FDI affects the quality of institutions 
in recipient countries. This relationship has been extensively analysed from the side of a higher 
quality of domestic institutions that are used to attract FDI from outside, whereas the other did not 
receive the same attention yet. Using a wide panel of 127 countries and 22 years, we estimate a 
series of pooled OLS, fixed effect and dynamic panel models to address endogeneity. In doing so, 
we also consider different groups of countries, different FDI variables and different types of 
                                                          
19 We did not use the QGOV relative to year 2017 since our time frame is from 1995 to 2016. 
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institution. In line with our expectations, we find that, in general, a higher amount of inward FDI 
significantly increases the average quality of domestic institutions; specifically, this holds more 
strongly for developing and transition economies, in particular when FDI is greenfield, and when 
institutions are conceived in terms of regulatory quality and rule of law, but also political stability 
and government effectiveness.  
These findings suggest that not only does a higher quality of institutions typically attract increasing 
FDI, but also that the latter, in turn, can lead to a rise in institutional quality, thus triggering a 
virtuous circle. This particularly holds for transition and developing countries, most of which, 
unlike advanced economies, are experiencing economic growth, processes of liberalization and 
democratization (in particular in the case of the transition economies), and institutional change. 
Since both the national governments and the foreign investors can benefit from a better 
institutional environment, local policy makers have the incentive to undertake reforms and face 
their institutional weaknesses. In doings so, not only do they increase the country’s attractiveness 
in terms of FDI, but also bring benefits to the society itself and its citizens. At the same time, 
MNEs investing in transition and developing countries are motivated to actively contribute to the 
local reform processes and to the improvement of public services.  
While the positive influence of FDI on political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory 
quality and rule of law is confirmed when the system GMM estimator is used, the effect on control 
of corruption is not robust across the estimates. This result is consistent with the ambiguous role 
played by FDI in either fostering or discouraging corruption, which can hinder the efficiency and 
strength of the government’s control of this widespread phenomenon.  
To conclude, not only do multinational firms benefit from a favourable business environment 
and/or from cheaper production factors in host countries, but they can also have an indirect positive 
influence on these economies by boosting their processes of catch-up, modernization and structural 
change. For this reason, as some authors averred, foreign investors may actually act as agents of 






Alesina A. & Perotti, R. (1996). Income distribution, political instability and investment. European 
Economic Review, 40(6), 1203–1228. 
Ali F., Fiess, F.A. & MacDonald, R. (2010). Do Institutions Matter for Foreign Direct Investment? Open 
Economies Review, 21(2), 201–219.  
Alonso, J.A. & Garcimartín, C. (2013). The Determinants of Institutional Quality. More on the Debate. 
Journal of International Development, 25, 206–226.  
Arellano, M. & Bond, S. (1991). Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo evidence and an 
application to employment equations, Review of Economic Studies, 58, 272–298. 
Arellano, M. & Bover, O. (1995). Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of error-component 
models, Journal of Econometrics, 68, 292–51. 
Arndt, C. & Oman, C. (2006). Uses and Abuses of Governance Indicators. OECD.Paris. 
Bailey, N. (2018). Exploring the relationship between institutional factors and FDI attractiveness: A meta-
analytic review. International Business Review, 27, 139–148. 
Bardhan, P. (1997). Corruption and development: a review of issues. Journal of Economic Literature, 35(3), 
1320 – 1346. 
Bayar, G. (2011). Causes of corruption: dynamic panel data analysis of some Post Soviet countries and East 
Asian countries. Journal of Applied Business Research, 27(1), 77–86.  
Bhagwati, J. N. (1987). Quid pro quo DFI and VIEs: a political-economy-theoretic analysis. International 
Economic Journal 1, 1–14. 
Blonigen, B. A. & Figlio, D. N. (1998). Voting for protection: does direct foreign investment influence 
legislator behavior? American Economic Review 88, 1002–1014. 
Blundell, R.W. & Bond, S. (1998). Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models, 
Journal of Econometrics, 87, 1152–143. 
Boddewyn, J. J. (1988). Political aspects of MNE theory. Journal of International Business Studies 19, 341–
363. 
Cole, M. A., Elliot, J. R., & Fredriksson, P. G. (2006). Endogenous pollution havens: Does FDI influence 
environmental regulations? Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 108(1), 157–178.  
104 
 
Craigwell, R. & Wright, A. (2011). Foreign direct investment and corruption in developing economies: 
Evidence from linear and non-linear panel Granger causality tests. Economics Bulletin, 31, 2272–2283.  
Dacin, M.T., Ventresca, M. & Beal, B. (1999). The embeddedness of organizations: dialogue and 
directions’, Journal of Management 25(3), 317–356. 
Dahan, N., Doh, J. & Guay, T. (2006). The role of multinational corporations in transnational institution 
building: A policy network perspective. Human Relations, 59(11), 1571–1600.  
Desbordes, R. & Vaudey, J. (2007). The political influence of foreign firms in developing countries. 
Economics and Politics, 19(3), 421–451.  
Diaz-Cayero, A., B. Magaloni, & B. R. Weingast (2003). Tragic Brilliance: Equilibrium Hegemony and 
Democratization in Mexico. Working Paper, Hoover Institution, Stanford University. 
DiMaggio, P. & Powell, W. (1983). The Iron cage revisited: institutional isomorphism and collective 
rationality in organizational fields’, American Sociological Review 48(2): 147–160.  
DiMaggio, P. (1988). Interest and agency in institutional theory. In L. G. Zucker (Ed.), Research on 
Institutional Patterns: Environment and Culture Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Co. 
Dunning, J. H. (2000). The eclectic paradigm as an envelope for economic and business theories of MNE 
Activity. International Business Review 9, 163–190.  
Dunning, J. H. & Lundan S. M. (2008a). Multinational enterprises and the global economy. Cheltenham 
(UK) and Northampton (USA), Edward Elgar. 
Gartzke, E., Li, Q., & Boehmer, C. (2001). Investing in the peace: Economic interdependence and 
international conflict. International Organization, 55, 391–438. 
Gawande, K., Krishna, P. & Robbins, M. J. (2006). Foreign lobbies and U.S. trade policy. The Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 88(3), 563–571. 
Gerring, J. & S. T. Thacker (2005). Do Neoliberal Policies Deter Political Corruption? International 
Organization 59 (1), 233–54. 




Grossman, G. M. & Helpman, E. (1996). Foreign investment with endogenous protection, in: R. Feenstra, 
G. Grossman & D. Irwin, eds., The Political Economy of Trade Policy: Papers in Honor of Jagdish 
Bhagwati (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA) 199–223. 
Haggard, S., & Noland, M. (2008). North Korea’s foreign economic relations. International Relations of 
the Asia-Pacific, 8, 219–246. 
Hellman, J., Jones, J. & Kaufmann, D. (2003). Seize the state, seize the day: state capture and influence in 
transition countries. Journal of Comparative Economics 31, 751–773. 
Henisz, W. J. (2003). The power of the Buckley and Casson thesis: the ability to manage institutional 
idiosyncracies. Journal of International Business Studies 34, 173–184. 
Heritage Foundation (2018). 2018 Index of Economic Freedom, http://www.heritage.org/index/ (last 
access: 21.09.2018). 
Hillman, A. J. & M. A. Hitt (1999). Corporate political strategy formulation: a model of approach, 
participation, and strategy decision. Academy of Management Review 24, 825–842. 
Hodgson, G. M. (2006). What are institutions? Journal of Economic Issues, 40(1), 1–25. 
Iammarino, S. & McCann, P. (2013). Multinationals and economic geography. Cheltenham (UK) and 
Northampton (USA), Edward Elgar. 
Islam R. & Montenegro, C. (2002). What determines the quality of institutions? World Development 
Report: Building Institutions for Markets, Washington (US). 
Jones-Luong, P. (2003). Economic Decentralization in Kazakhstan: Causes and Consequences. In: The 
Transformation of Central Asia: States and Societies from Soviet Rule to Independence, ed. Jones-Luong. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 182–212. 
Kahler, M., & Kastner, S. L. (2006). Strategic uses of economic interdependence: Engagement policies on 
the Korean Peninsula and across the Taiwan Strait. Journal of Peace Research, 43, 523–541.  
Kaufmann, D. Kraay A., & Mastruzzi M. (2007) .Worldwide governance indicators project: Answering the 
critics. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4149. 
Kaufmann, D. Kraay A., & Mastruzzi M. (2009). Governance matters VIII:  governance indicators for  
1996-2008. World Bank Policy Research Working  Paper  No. 4978.  
106 
 
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. & Mastruzzi, M. (2011). The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology 
and Analytical Issues. Hague Journal on the Rule of Law, 3(2), 220–24. 
Kim, K. (2016). Impacts of Foreign Direct Investment on the Most Centralized Country: Evidence from 
Gaeseong Industrial Complex in North Korea. Thunderbird International Business Review, 58(4), 305–
316. 
Knack, S. & Azfar, O. (2003). Trade intensity, country size and corruption. Economic Governance ,4(1), 
1–18. 
Knack, S. (2006). Measuring corruption in Eastern Europe and central Asia: A critique of the cross-country 
indicators. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3968. 
Kostova, T. & Zaheer, S. (1999). Organizational legitimacy under conditions of complexity: the case of the 
multinational enterprise. Academy of Management Review 34, 64–81. 
 Kwok, C.C. & Tadesse, S. (2006). The MNC as an agent of change for host-country institutions: FDI and 
corruption. Journal of International Business Studies 37, 767–785. 
Hewko, J. (2003). Foreign Direct Investment in Transitional Economies: Does the Rule of Law Matter?” 
East European Constitutional Review, Fall2002/Winter2003, 71–79. 
Larrain B., F. & Tavares, J. (2004). Does foreign direct investment decrease corruption? Cuadernos de 
Economia, 41, 217–230.  
Lee, J-H., & Lee, W-K. (2013). GIC and small/medium-sized enterprises: Present and prospect. KDI North 
Korea Economic Review, pp. 8–29. 
Lee, M-H. & M. C. Lio (2016). The Impact of Foreign Direct Investment on Public Governance and 
Corruption in China. The China Review, 16(2), 105–135.  
Lehne, J., Mo, J. & Plekhanov, A. (2014). What determines the quality of economic institutions? Cross-
country evidence. EBRD Working Paper No. 171.  
Lewbel, A. (2012). Using Heteroscedasticity to Identify and Estimate Mismeasured and Endogenous 
Regressor Models. Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 30(1), 66–80.  
Levy, J. S. (2003). Economic interdependence, opportunity costs, and peace. In E. D. Mansfield & B. 
Pollins (Eds.), Economic interdependence and international conflict: New perspectives on an enduring 
debate (127–147). Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
107 
 
Lin, F. (2018). Cross-country diffusion of ideology via FDI. Micro-evidence from China. Economics of 
Transition, 6(1), 3–34.  
Lin, L., Moon, J. J. & Yin, H. (2014). Does International Economic Integration Lead to a Cleaner 
Production in China? Production and Operations Management, 23(4), 525–536.  
Malesky, E. J. (2008). Straight Ahead on Red: How Foreign Direct Investment Empowers Subnational 
Leaders. The Journal of Politics, 70(1), 97–119.  
Malesky, E. J. (2009). Foreign Direct Investors as Agents of Economic Transition: An Instrumental 
Variables Analysis. Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 4, 59–85.  
Martin, W. & McKibbin, W. (1999). The East Asian crisis: Investigating causes and policy responses. 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2172, Washington DC: World Bank. 
Mondolo, J. (2018). How do informal institutions influence inward FDI? A systematic review, Economia 
Politica – Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, online- first, doi: 10.1007/s40888-018-0119-
1.  
Neffke F., Hartog M., Boschma R. & Henning M. (2018). Agents of structural change: the role of firms and 
entrepreneurs in regional diversification, Economic Geography,  94(1), 23-48. 
North, D. (1990). Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. Cambridge (UK). 
Cambridge University Press.  
Okada, A. (2004). Skills Development and Interfirm Learning Linkages under Globalization: Lessons from 
the Indian Automobile Industry. World Development, 32(7), 1265–1288.  
Pinto, P. M. & Zhu, B. (2016). Fortune or Evil? The Effect of Inward Foreign Direct Investment on 
Corruption. International Studies Quarterly, 60(4), 693–705.  
Polacheck, S. W., Seiglie, C., & Xiang, J. (2012). Can Foreign Direct Investment Increase Cooperation 
Among Nations? The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Peace and Conflict.  Oxford University Press  
Ramirez, A. & Kwok, C. (2009). Multinationality as a Moderator of National Institutions: The Case of 
Culture and Capital Structure Decisions. Multinational Business Review, 17(3), 2–28.  
Rasiah, R. (2002). Systemic Coordination and Human Capital Development: Knowledge Flows in 
Malaysia's MNC-Driven Electronics Clusters. Transnational Corporations, 1(3), 89–129.  
108 
 
Roberson, C. J.  & Watson, A. (2004). Corruption and Change: The Impact of Foreign Direct Investment. 
Strategic Management Journal, 25(4), 385–396.  
Roodman, D. (2009). A Note on the Theme of Too Many Instruments. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and 
Statistics, 71(1), 1–158.  
Rose-Ackerman, S. (1975). The economics of corruption. Journal of Public Economics, 4(2), 187–203. 
Russett, B. & Oneal, J. R. (2001). Triangulating peace: Democracy, interdependence, and international 
organizations. New York, NY: W. W. Norton. 
Sandholtz, W. & Gray, M. M. (2003). International Integration and National Corruption. International 
Organization 57(4), 761–800. 
Scott, W. R. (2008a). Institutions and Organizations: Ideas and Interests. 3rd ed. Thousand Oaks (CA). 
Sage Publications. 
Tintin, C. (2013). The determinants of foreign direct investment inflows in the Central and Eastern 
European countries: The importance of institutions. Communist Post-Communist Studies. 46, 287–298. 
UNCTAD (2009). Training manual on statistics for FDI and the operations of TNCs (Volume 1). United 
Nations Publication, Geneva.  
UNCTAD (2017). World Investment Report 2017. United Nations Publication, Geneva. 
UNCTAD (2018). World Investment Report 2018. United Nations Publication, Geneva.  
Walsh, J. P. & Yu, J. (2010). Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment: A Sectoral and Institutional 
Approach. IMF Working Paper, WP/10/187. 
Wei, S. J. (2000a). How Taxing is Corruption on International Investors? Review of Economics and 
Statistics, 82(1), 1–11. 
Westney, E. (1993). Cross‐Pacific internationalization of R&D by U.S. and Japanese firms. R&D 
Management, 23(2), 171-181.  
World Bank Group (2018). Worldwide Governance Indicators.  
info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home (last access: 24.09.2018). 
109 
 
Wrana, G. &. Revilla-Diez, J. R. (2016). Can Multinational Enterprises Introduce New Institutions to Host 
Countries? Geographische Zeitschrift, 104(3), 158–182.  
Yang, M. S., Lee, W.Y. & Yoon, C.G. (2013). A study on the effects of the contact in Kaesong Industrial 
Complex upon North Korean workers: Focusing North Korean workers’ attitudes toward South Korea. 
Unification Study, 17, 131–158. 
Zeng, K. & Eastin, J. (2012). Do Developing Countries Invest Up? The Environmental Effects of Foreign 
Direct Investment from Less-Developed. World Development, 40(11), 2221–2233. 
110 
 
TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 3.1 Recent empirical papers concerning the influence if inward FDI on some type of domestic institution  
 
Author  dependent 
variable  




conclusions  Effect on host 
country’s 
institutions  
Bayar (2011)  corruption (CPI) FDI inflows as % of total 
fixed investment in the 
country 
10 (ex URSS and East-
Asia), 1999-2009 
✓ Past values of corruption and the level of 
political rights are relevant causes of corruption 
in the sample examined, while other variables 
including FDI inflows seem not to have a 
significant effect. 
NOT REL 
Cole et al. (2006) environmental 
regulatory 
stringency (grams 
of lead content per 
gallon of gasoline 
) 
lagged inward FDI stocks 
and flows scaled by 
GDP, interaction term 
between corruption and 
FDI 
33 developed and 
developing countries, 
1982-1992 
✓ Inward FDI has a positive impact on the 
stringency of environmental regulations when 
the level of local government's corruptibility is 
low; at higher levels of corruptibility, this 







FDI as a share of GDP  42 developing 
countries, years 1998-
2009 
✓ When linear panel methods are used, the 
majority of the markets indicate a bidirectional 
causal link between FDI and corruption. In 
contrast, for the nonlinear tests, the link from 




Kwok & Tadesse 
(2006) 
corruption (CPI); 
also changes in 
corruption in the 
robustness checks 
(past) FDI as a share of 
GDP in different time 
frames. In the robustness 
checks, also: interaction 
between FDI variable 
and education, between 
FDI and cultural values, 
dummies indicating 
whether a country is a 
based on their rankings 
of FDI flows 
 sample varying 
between 40 and 100 
countries according to 
the model 
specification; average 
of years 2000-2004 
✓ Current corruption levels are significantly 
lower in countries with high FDI flows in the 
past. Moreover, harmful effects of culture on 
corruption are lower and the beneficial effects 
of education on corruption are higher in 
countries with higher FDI in the past. 
POS 
Larrain B. & 
Tavares (2004) 
corruption (ICRG) gross FDI inflows as a 
share of GDP 
a large cross section of 
countries, years 1970-
1994 
✓ Higher FDI inflows are shown to significantly 
deter corruption. 
POS 












✓ Foreign capital and investors improved 
governance performance and reduced 
corruption of Chinese provincial governments. 
POS 
Lin (2018)  freedom of speech a dummy indicating 
whether an individual 
works in a foreign-
invested enterprise 
extensive individual 
surveys conducted in 
28 provinces of 
mainland China, 2013 
✓ The individuals working in foreign-invested 
enterprises (especially non-Hong Kong, Macao 
and Taiwan invested enterprises) tend to be 
more in favour of freedom of speech than 










discharges  and 
SO2 emissions 
(SEPB) 
firms with foreign 
control or not (dummy) 
565 firms in Shangai  
 
Foreign-invested firms are more likely to 
comply with environmental regulations than 
firms with no international linkage because the 
latter motivates firms to improve their 
environmental compliance and also provide 
them with the means to achieve that goal. 
POS 
Malesky (2008) whether a 
province has 
engaged in an 
autonomous action 










✓ FDI appears to have a powerful and robust 
impact on de facto decentralization regarding 
economic policy. 
POS 




annual change in the 
stock of FDI as a 
percentage of GDP 
27 transition countries, 
years 1991-2004 
✓ FDI has a positive and relevant impact on 
economic reforms in transition economies. 
POS 
Pinto & Zhu 
(2016) 
corruption (CPI) real FDI stock  per capita 
( 5-year average) , 
95 , average 2000-
2004  
✓ The effects of inward FDI on corruption are 
expected to vary with local conditions in the 




interaction term between 
GDP per capita and FDI 
with higher levels of 
corruption in less developed countries, but not 
in developed countries.  
 
Polacheck et al. 
(2012)  
military conflicts dyadic FDI flows  29 OECD host-
countries and their 
source countries, for a 
total of 53 different 
countries 
✓ A 10% increase in FDI is associated with an 




corruption (CPI) FDI per capita, change in 
level of inward FDI  
From 88 to 99 
countries, years 1999 
and 2000 
 
The more rapid the rate of change in FDI, the 







German and Japanese 
MNE involved in local 
educational projects 
Vietnam, interviews 
conducted in 2014 
 
MNEs can influence regional education 
systems by introducing institutional elements 
of their home country's skill formation system. 
 
POS 
Zeng & Eastin 
(2012) 
 number of ISO 
14001-certified 





share of  total inward FDI 
stocks countries in GDP 
and of inward FDI from 
different areas 





Less-developed countries' MNEs find it 
increasing financially advantageous to signal to 
consumers, investors, and potential business 
partners their commitment to environmental 








Table 3.2 Correlation matrix and summary statistics 
 
 Mean St.dev. Min Max 1.  2.  3. 4. 5.  6.  7.  8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 
1. QGOV 0.516 0.147 0.232 0.828 1            
2. RFDI 6526.5 46065.3 0 1452963 0.343 1           
3. FDI/GDP 0.050 0.172 -0.589 4.996 0.164 0.001 1          
4. GRFDI 103.2 218.9 0 1933 0.407 0.575 -0.081 1         
5. POP 4.8e+07 1.57e+08 206963 1.38e+09 -0.275 0.315 -0.352 0.578 1        
6. DEN 179.9 602.2 1.479 6996.9 0.087 0.123 -0.010 0.219 0.138 1       
7. TRADE 0.853 0.492 0.156 4.426 0.272 -0.028 0.435 -0.101 -0.595 0.152 1      
8. INFL 0.092 0.319 -0.272 9.586 -0.368 -0.132 -0.046 -0.119 0.121 -0.134 -0.122 1     
9. UNEMP 0.087 0.063 0.001 0.393 0.067 0.018 0.065 -0.059 -0.114 -0.184 -0.023 -0.035 1    
10. IND 0.301 0.143 0.068 2.137 -0.112 0.050 -0.154 0.217 0.154 -0.242 -0.048 0.131 -0.143 1   
11. SERV 0.572 0.128 0.094 0.931 0.634 0.311 0.143 0.272 -0.191 0.235 0.173 -0.289 0.273 -0.477 1  
12. BROADTEL 0.265 0.263 0.001 1.021 0.675 0.373 0.081 0.522 -0.162 0.099 0.266 -0.216 0.095 0.119 0.584 1 
 
Note: summary statistics refer to the variables before logarithmic transformation. Correlations, instead, refer to variables transformed in natural logarithm
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Table 3.3 Inward FDI and quality of institutions: pooled OLS estimates 







    
 (0.002) (0.002)     
ln_FDI/GDP   0.015*** 0.011**   
   (0.005) (0.005)   
ln_GRFDI     0.081*** 0.077*** 
     (0.012) (0.009) 
ln_POP -0.043*** -0.058*** -0.034*** -0.049*** -0.103*** -0.116*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011) 
ln_DENS 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.002 0.007 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
ln_TRADE 0.007 -0.033 0.001 -0.036 -0.037 -0.091*** 
 (0.027) (0.025) (0.028) (0.026) (0.032) (0.023) 
ln_INFL -0.040** -0.052** -0.051** -0.064** -0.290*** -0.254** 
 (0.019) (0.026) (0.020) (0.028) (0.105) (0.119) 
ln_UNEMP -0.020 -0.024* -0.023 -0.026* -0.022 -0.023* 
 (0.016) (0.014) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) 
ln_IND 0.013 -0.003 0.025 0.008 -0.014 -0.043 
 (0.033) (0.029) (0.033) (0.031) (0.041) (0.036) 
ln_SERV 0.197*** 0.195*** 0.222*** 0.225*** 0.161** 0.139** 
 (0.058) (0.060) (0.061) (0.065) (0.064) (0.068) 
ln_BROADTEL 0.060*** 0.044*** 0.064*** 0.048*** 0.031* 0.010 
 (0.017) (0.013) (0.017) (0.013) (0.017) (0.013) 
OECD 0.207*** 0.204*** 0.216*** 0.211*** 0.203*** 0.186*** 
 (0.029) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.024) (0.028) 
UEMOA  0.075  0.082  0.106* 
  (0.056)  (0.055)  (0.060) 
COMESA_FTA  -0.109  -0.111  -0.117 
  (0.110)  (0.111)  (0.104) 
SADC  0.175***  0.176***  0.194*** 
  (0.053)  (0.054)  (0.045) 
APEC  0.184***  0.178***  0.186*** 
  (0.046)  (0.045)  (0.048) 
UNASUR  -0.051  -0.048  -0.020 
  (0.039)  (0.041)  (0.035) 
CACM  -0.021  -0.021  0.012 
  (0.052)  (0.053)  (0.039) 
NAFTA  -0.042  -0.026  -0.049 
  (0.108)  (0.110)  (0.100) 
ASEAN  -0.033  -0.032  -0.074 
  (0.049)  (0.049)  (0.059) 
MERCOSUR  0.085  0.083  0.091* 
  (0.070)  (0.069)  (0.050) 
EU_SCHN  0.139***  0.148***  0.128*** 
  (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.029) 
Area dummies Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 2794 2794 2794 2794 1778 1778 
Number of countries 127 127 127 127 127 127 
R2 0.799 0.765 0.797 0.761 0.841 0.815 
Mean VIF 3.57 2.02 3.53 1.97 4.16 2.24 
All the models include a constant term. Country-level cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.  * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p <0.01.  
116 
 
Table 3.4 Inward FDI and quality of institutions: fixed effects estimates  
 
Dep var: ln_QGOV 
Whole sample 






 (0.001)   
ln_FDI/GDP  0.004*  
  (0.002)  
ln_GRFDI   0.025*** 
   (0.006) 
ln_POP -0.217 -0.184 -1.820*** 
 (0.387) (0.396) (0.471) 
ln_DENS 0.132 0.096 1.691*** 
 (0.412) (0.421) (0.522) 
ln_TRADE -0.011 -0.020 -0.040** 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.019) 
ln_INFL -0.012 -0.015 -0.071*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.022) 
ln_UNEMP -0.007 -0.006 -0.016 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) 
ln_IND 0.024 0.029 0.053* 
 (0.041) (0.042) (0.031) 
ln_SERV 0.029 0.029 0.037 
 (0.043) (0.044) (0.033) 
ln_BROADTEL -0.006 -0.002 0.011 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) 
Area dummies No No No 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 2794 2794 1778 
Number of countries 127 127 127 
Within R2 0.063 0.056 0.165 
 




Table 3.5 Inward FDI and quality of institutions: SYS-GMM estimates 
 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
 
Dep var: ln_QGOV (1) (2) (3) 
whole sample       
       
ln_QGOVt-1 0.870*** 0.981*** 0.720*** 
  (0.071) (0.102) (0.086) 
ln_RFDI 0.004***    
  (0.001)    
ln_FDI/GDP   0.001°°   
    (0.011)   
ln_GRFDI    0.014* 
     (0.008) 
ln_POP -0.021 -0.013 -0.064** 
  (0.015) (0.040) (0.031) 
ln_DENS -0.009 -0.020 0.029 
  (0.016) (0.100) (0.026) 
ln_TRADE -0.022** -0.018 -0.032*** 
  (0.010) (0.067) (0.011) 
INFL 0.000 -0.003 -0.006 
  (0.006) (0.015) (0.012) 
ln_UNEMP -0.002 -0.004 0.009 
  (0.004) (0.018) (0.006) 
ln_SERV 0.015 0.013 0.000 
  (0.015) (0.104) (0.020) 
ln_IND 0.024** 0.030 0.017 
  (0.012) (0.122) (0.013) 
ln_BROADTEL -0.005 -0.003 0.009* 
  (0.006) (0.072) (0.006) 
OECD 0.011 0.006 -0.007 
  (0.011) (0.112) (0.016) 
Area dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 2,667 2,667 1,778 
Number of countries 127 127 127 
Number of instruments 129 129 85 
AR (1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR (2) 0.6325 0.583 0.2306 
Sargan 0.3191 0.1645 0.152 
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Table 3.6 Inward FDI and quality of institutions in advanced economies: pooled OLS and FE 
Dep var:ln_QGOV (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 





   
0.001** 
  
 (0.001)   (0.000)   
ln_FDI/GDP  0.002   0.001  
  (0.002)   (0.001)  
ln_GRFDI   0.019   0.008* 
   (0.012)   (0.004) 
ln_POP -0.012 -0.009 -0.036** -0.145 -0.096 -1.510 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.017) (0.267) (0.268) (1.279) 
ln_DENS 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.337 0.283 1.756 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.292) (0.299) (1.247) 
ln_TRADE 0.018 0.016 -0.010 0.025 0.023 -0.014 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.035) (0.033) (0.033) (0.029) 
ln_INFL -0.176 -0.129 -0.210 0.158 0.180 0.052 
 (0.120) (0.130) (0.154) (0.115) (0.112) (0.097) 
ln_UNEMP -0.026 -0.027 -0.028 -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.031*** 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) 
In_lND 0.071** 0.070** 0.066** -0.010 -0.007 0.005 
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.030) (0.016) (0.015) (0.021) 
ln_SERV -0.034*** -0.033*** -0.030*** -0.010** -0.011** -0.008 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
ln_BROADTEL 0.025 0.025 0.013 0.004 0.004 0.021 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.035) (0.020) (0.021) (0.022) 
OECD 0.030 0.026 0.003    
 (0.042) (0.044) (0.051)    
Area dummies Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 550 550 350 550 550 350 
Number of countries 25 25 25 25 25 25 
R2 0.811 0.808 0.840 0.341 0.336 0.393 
Mean VIF 5.12 5.11 7.18    
 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
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Table 3.7 Inward FDI and quality of institutions in advanced countries: SYS-GMM 
estimates  
Dep var: QGOV (1) (2) (3) 
Advanced countries       
       
ln_QGOVt-1 0.836*** 0.772*** 0.754*** 
  (0.047) (0.052) (0.052) 
ln_RFDI 0.001***    
  (0.000)    
ln_FDI/GDP   -0.000   
    (0.001)   
ln_GRFDI    0.002 
     (0.005) 
ln_POP -0.007 -0.003 -0.001 
  (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) 
ln_DENS 0.006 0.004 0.004 
  (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) 
ln_TRADE -0.002 0.019 0.019 
  (0.015) (0.012) (0.012) 
INFL -0.061 -0.015 0.016 
  (0.048) (0.054) (0.066) 
ln_UNEMP -0.006 -0.012** -0.014** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
ln_SERV -0.011*** -0.010** -0.007** 
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
ln_IND 0.017 0.024 -0.002 
  (0.015) (0.018) (0.016) 
ln_BROADTEL 0.003 0.004 -0.015 
  (0.010) (0.012) (0.015) 
OECD 0.037 0.018 -0.001 
  (0.040) (0.025) (0.025) 
Area dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 525 525 350 
Number of countries 25 25 25 
Number of instruments 127 127 84 
AR (1) 0.0002 0.0002 0.0005 
AR (2) 0.8114 0.5472 0.1584 
Sargan 0.0039 0.0002 0.0128 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 3.8 Inward FDI and quality of institutions in transition economies: pooled OLS and FE 
 
 
Dep var: ln_QGOV (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 





   
0.000 
  
 (0.004)   (0.001)   
ln_FDI/GDP  0.015*   0.000  
  (0.008)   (0.003)  
ln_GRFDI   0.062***   0.022** 
   (0.013)   (0.009) 
ln_POP -0.107*** -0.104*** -0.109*** -4.666 -4.678 -7.705*** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.022) (3.880) (3.872) (1.372) 
ln_DENS 0.031 0.029 0.034 4.457 4.469 7.504*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.028) (3.839) (3.832) (1.324) 
ln_TRADE -0.111** -0.143*** -0.013 -0.069* -0.069* 0.001 
 (0.050) (0.050) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.020) 
ln_INFL -0.010 -0.017 -0.299* 0.005 0.005 -0.025 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.148) (0.010) (0.010) (0.026) 
ln_UNEMP 0.050 0.051 0.025 0.018 0.018 -0.001 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.034) (0.018) (0.018) (0.016) 
ln_IND 0.209* 0.232** 0.244*** 0.163** 0.163** 0.179*** 
 (0.101) (0.103) (0.074) (0.076) (0.076) (0.058) 
ln_SERV 0.294* 0.326* 0.493*** 0.097 0.097 0.153* 
 (0.165) (0.164) (0.111) (0.138) (0.138) (0.075) 
ln_BROADTEL 0.111** 0.117** 0.053 0.029 0.029 0.090*** 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.042) (0.036) (0.036) (0.031) 
OECD 0.198*** 0.216*** 0.145***    
 (0.037) (0.041) (0.037)    
Area dummies Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 550 550 350 550 550 350 
Number of countries 25 25 25 25 25 25 
R2 0.848 0.844 0.909 0.323 0.323 0.473 
Mean VIF 2.86 2.79 3.82    
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 3.9 Inward FDI and quality of institutions in transition economies: SYS-GMM 
 
Dep var: ln_QGOV (1)                 (2) (3) 
Transition economies       
       
ln_QGOVt-1 0.890*** 0.844*** 0.788*** 
  (0.045) (0.035) (0.055) 
ln_RFDI 0.000    
  (0.001)    
ln_FDI/GDP   0.004*   
    (0.002)   
ln_GRFDI    0.032*** 
     (0.009) 
ln_POP -0.001 -0.006 -0.076*** 
  (0.013) (0.014) (0.027) 
ln_DENS 0.015 0.021* 0.019 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.024) 
ln_TRADE 0.013 0.014 -0.022 
  (0.016) (0.013) (0.024) 
INFL 0.001 0.001 0.023 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.038) 
ln_UNEMP 0.026*** 0.017** 0.024*** 
  (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) 
ln_SERV 0.066* 0.071* -0.004 
  (0.038) (0.038) (0.053) 
ln_IND 0.054** 0.059** 0.060* 
  (0.027) (0.026) (0.033) 
ln_BROADTEL 0.018 0.018 -0.002 
  (0.014) (0.013) (0.019) 
OECD 0.007 0.014 0.016 
  (0.008) (0.009) (0.016) 
Area dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 525 525 350 
Number of countries 25 25 25 
Number of instruments  128 128 85 
AR (1) 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
AR (2) 0.8447 0.6925 0.2987 
Sargan 0.0042 0.000 0.0013 




Table 3.10 Inward FDI and quality of institutions in developing countries: pooled OLS and FE 
Dep var: ln_QGOV (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 











   
0.005*** 
  
 (0.004)   (0.002)   
ln_FDI/GDP  0.020***   0.007*  
  (0.007)   (0.004)  
ln_GRFDI   0.090***   0.033*** 
   (0.016)   (0.007) 
ln_POP -0.039*** -0.026** -0.104*** -0.263 -0.211 -1.510*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.018) (0.412) (0.421) (0.449) 
ln_DENS -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.308 0.241 1.442*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.431) (0.440) (0.515) 
ln_TRADE 0.018 0.013 -0.033 0.002 -0.012 -0.042 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.045) (0.023) (0.025) (0.027) 
ln_INFL -0.090 -0.114 -0.230* -0.053* -0.063** -0.064** 
 (0.073) (0.074) (0.123) (0.027) (0.029) (0.026) 
ln_UNEMP -0.032** -0.037** -0.026 0.001 0.004 -0.015 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.021) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) 
ln_IND -0.016 -0.000 -0.023 0.003 0.006 0.056 
 (0.042) (0.040) (0.050) (0.043) (0.045) (0.040) 
ln_SERV 0.156** 0.187** 0.149 0.040 0.033 0.061 
 (0.072) (0.073) (0.093) (0.053) (0.057) (0.053) 
ln_BROADTEL 0.061*** 0.066*** 0.024 -0.001 0.004 0.005 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) 
OECD 0.109** 0.123** 0.147***    
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.051)    
Area dummies Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 1694 1694 1078 1694 1694 1078 
Number of countries 77 77 77 77 77 77 
R2 0.569 0.567 0.648 0.106 0.091 0.178 
Mean VIF 2.98 3.00 3.49    




Table 3.11 Inward FDI and quality of institutions in developing countries: SYS-GMM 
 
Dep var: ln_QGOV                    (1)         (2)                              (3) 
Developing countries       
       
ln_QGOVt-1 0.936*** 0.939***  0.810*** 
  (0.033) (0.041) (0.064) 
ln_RFDI 0.005***    
  (0.002)    
ln_FDI/GDP   0.003°°°   
    (0.002)   
ln_GRFDI    0.024*** 
     (0.009) 
ln_POP -0.016** -0.021** -0.050*** 
  (0.007) (0.009) (0.014) 
ln_DENS -0.007 0.001 0.017 
  (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) 
ln_TRADE -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.037*** 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) 
INFL -0.026*** -0.025*** -0.017 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) 
ln_UNEMP -0.007 -0.008 0.004 
  (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) 
ln_SERV 0.026 0.013 0.027 
  (0.024) (0.023) (0.028) 
ln_IND 0.031** 0.026** 0.029 
  (0.016) (0.013) (0.018) 
ln_BROADTEL -0.003 0.001 0.004 
  (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) 
OECD 0.016 0.011 -0.003 
  (0.026) (0.024) (0.040) 
Area dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 1,617 1,617 1,078 
Number of countries 77 77 77 
Number of instruments 129 129 85 
AR (1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR (2) 0.2984 0.2572 0.4469 
Sargan 0.000 0.000 0.0001 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, °°°p<0.01 with ln_FDI/POP. 
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Table 3.12 FDI and the six dimensions of institutional quality: summary of FDI estimates  
 
 
 Transition economies Developing economies 
Voice & Accountability (1)Pooled OLS (2)FE (3)SYS-GMM (4)Pooled OLS (5)FE (6)SYS-GMM 
ln_RFDI 0.019*** 0.001 0.003 0.010** 0.004*** -0.001 
  (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) 
ln_FDI/GDP 0.023* 0.001 0.001°° 0.01 -0.001 -0.009 
  (0.013) (0.004) (0.003) (0.01) (0.005) (0.005) 
ln_GRFDI 0.058 0.003 0.027** 0.057** 0.014 0.014 
  (0.036) (0.01) (0.013) (0.023) (0.011) (0.017) 
Political Stability Pooled OLS FE SYS-GMM Pooled OLS FE SYS-GMM 
ln_RFDI 0.014** 0.002 -0.004 0.011* 0.007* 0.013** 
  (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) 
ln_FDI/GDP 0.028* 0.005 0.013 0.019 0.004 0.013°°° 
  (0.014) (0.008) (0.015) (0.013) (0.008) (0.011) 
ln_GRFDI 0.051*** 0.058** 0.091* 0.088*** 0.074*** 0.071* 
  (0.015) (0.024) (0.051) (0.012) (0.019) (0.040) 
Government Effectiveness Pooled OLS FE SYS-GMM Pooled OLS FE SYS-GMM 
ln_RFDI 0.010*** 0.000 0.001 0.014*** 0.004** 0.001 
  (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
ln_FDI/GDP 0.012 0.000 0.001°°° 0.017** 0.006 0.003°° 
  (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002) 
ln_GRFDI 0.054*** 0.007 0.016 0.054*** 0.023*** 0.019* 
  (0.011) (0.015) (0.016) (0.011) (0.007) (0.011) 
Regulatory Quality Pooled OLS FE SYS-GMM Pooled OLS FE SYS-GMM 
ln_RFDI 0.019*** 0.001 0.002 0.021*** 0.008*** 0.007** 
  (0.007) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) 
ln_FDI/GDP 0.023* -0.002 0.011* 0.029*** 0.015*** -0.008°°° 
  (0.012) (0.003) (0.006) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005) 
ln_GRFDI 0.088*** 0.026* 0.039*** 0.115*** 0.041*** 0.033 
  (0.026) (0.015) (0.014) (0.02) (0.009) (0.021) 
Rule of Law Pooled OLS FE SYS-GMM Pooled OLS FE SYS-GMM 
ln_RFDI 0.008** 0.000 0.001 0.016*** 0.007*** 0.002 
  (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) 
ln_FDI/GDP 0.006 -0.003 -0.002 0.028*** 0.014*** -0.001°° 
  (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.005) (0.003) 
ln_GRFDI 0.069*** 0.021** 0.046*** 0.108*** 0.041*** 0.029** 




Control of Corruption Pooled OLS FE SYS-GMM Pooled OLS FE SYS-GMM 
ln_RFDI 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.011*** 0.003** 0.002 
  (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.003) 
ln_FDI/GDP (0.003) -0.002 -0.003 0.016* 0.003 0.005 
  (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.008) (0.004) (0.003) 
ln_GRFDI 0.067*** 0.021** 0.010 0.089*** 0.022*** 0.005 
  (0.015) (0.008) (0.010) (0.017) (0.007) (0.011) 
Area dummies Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of countries 25 25 25 77 77 77 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; °° p<0.05 with ln_FDI/POP, °°°p<0.01 with 
ln_FDI/POP.                                     

















Table 3.13 Inward FDI and the index of Economic Freedom (summary of FDI estimates)  
 
 Transition economies  Developing economies 
Dep var: ln_ECFR (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
   Pooled OLS  FE SYS-GMM  Pooled OLS  FE SYS-GMM 
             
ln_RFDI 0.009** 0.001 0.002 0.009*** 0.004** 0.001 
  (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
ln_FDI/GDP 0.005 -0.003 0.000 0.013* 0.009** 0.002°° 
  (0.007) (0.002) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.003) 
ln_GRFDI 0.048*** 0.020** 0.013* 0.063*** 0.017*** 0.025** 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.013) (0.006) (0.011) 
Area dummies Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of countries 25 25 25 77 77 77 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 













Table 3.14 Lagged inward FDI and the quality of institutions (summary of FDI estimates)  
 
 Transition economies Developing economies 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) 
 Dep var: ln_QGOV Pooled OLS FE Pooled OLS FE 
      
One-lagged regressors         
ln_RFDIt-1 0.013*** 0.000 0.014*** 0.006*** 
  (0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) 
ln_FDI/GDPt-1 0.014 0.001* 0.018** 0.004 
  (0.009) (0.003) (0.008) (0.004) 
ln_GRGDIt-1 0.061*** 0.024*** 0.090*** 0.004 
  (0.013) (0.007) (0.016) (0.004) 
Two-lagged regressors        
ln_RFDIt-2 0.013** -0.001 0.014*** 0.005** 
  (0.006) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) 
ln_FDI/GDPt-2 0.015 0.002 0.016** 0.001 
  (0.009) (0.003) (0.008) (0.004) 
ln_GRGDIt-2 0.053*** 0.017** 0.088*** 0.018** 
  (0.015) (0.008) (0.016) (0.008) 
Three-lagged regressors        
ln_RFDIt-3 0.014** -0.001 0.014*** 0.003* 
  (0.006) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) 
ln_FDI/GDPt-3 0.016* 0.004 0.014* -0.001 
  (0.009) (0.003) (0.007) (0.004) 
ln_GRGDIt-3 0.052*** 0.009 0.014* 0.013* 
  (0.015) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) 
Area dummies Yes No Yes No 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of countries 525 525 77 77 
 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 







Table 3.15 Cumulative FDI and the quality of institutions (summary of FDI estimates) 
 
 
 OLS Lewbel’s (2012) approach 
dep var: ln_QGOV(a) 
Whole sample (1) (2) 
ln_CUMRFDI1995-2005 0.043*** 0.034*** 
  (0.011) (0.007) 
ln_CUMGRFDI2003-2009 0.091*** 0.063*** 
  (0.025) (0.013) 
ln_CUMRFDI2005-2016 0.036*** 0.033*** 
  (0.012) (0.007) 
ln_CUMGRFDI2010-2016 0.116*** 0.119*** 
  (0.019) (0.012) 
Area dummies Yes Yes 
Time dummies Yes Yes 
Number of countries 127 127 
 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
(a)CUMRFDI1995-2005 on QGOV in 2006, CUMRFDI2006-2016 on QGOV in 2016, GRFDI2003-2009 on QGOV in 2010,  
CUMGRFDI2010-2016  on QGOV in 2016.   
Note: due to space constraints, the estimates of the other regressors are not reported. Complete estimates provided in the 
























Table A.3.1 List of countries  
advanced countries transition economies developing economies 
Australia Albania Algeria Gambia Morocco 
Austria Armenia Argentina Ghana Mozambique 
Belgium Azerbaijan Bahrain Guatemala Namibia 
Canada Belarus Bangladesh Guinea Nepal 
Cyprus Bosnia and Herzegovina Barbados Guyana Nicaragua 
Denmark Bulgaria Belize Honduras Nigeria 
Finland Croatia Benin Hong Kong Pakistan 
France Czech Republic Bhutan India Panama 
Germany Estonia Bolivia Indonesia Paraguay 
Greece Georgia Botswana Iran Peru 
Iceland Hungary Brazil Jamaica Philippines 
Ireland Kazakhstan Burkina Faso Jordan Qatar 
Italy Kyrgyz Republic Cabo Verde Kenya Rwanda 
Japan Latvia Cambodia Korea, Rep. Saudi Arabia 
Luxembourg Lithuania Cameroon Kuwait Senegal 
Malta Macedonia Chad Laos South Africa 
Netherlands Moldova Chile Lebanon Sri Lanka 
New Zealand Poland China Lesotho Tanzania 
Norway Romania Colombia Madagascar Thailand 
Portugal Russia Costa Rica Malawi Tunisia 
Spain Slovakia Cote d'Ivoire Malaysia Turkey 
Sweden Slovenia Ecuador Mali Uganda 
Switzerland Tajikistan Egypt Mauritania Uruguay 
United Kingdom Ukraine El Salvador Mexico Venezuela 
United States Uzbekistan Ethiopia Mongolia Vietnam 
       Zambia 
        Zimbabwe 







Table A.3.2 Variable list  
 
Variable name  
 






















Index of governance (average of the six WGI) 
 
 








Rule of Law 
 
Control of Corruption 
 
 
Index of Economic Freedom  
 
World Bank’s Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI) 
dataset 
World Bank’s WGI dataset 
 
World Bank’s WGI dataset 
 
World Bank’s WGI dataset 
 
World Bank’s WGI dataset 
 
World Bank’s WGI dataset 
 
World Bank’s WGI dataset 
 
 
Heritage Foundation’s Index of 























real FDI inflows (FDI inflows in million 





FDI inflows/ host country’s GDP 
 
number of (announced) greenfield FDI projects 
 
United Nations’ UNCTAD 
database (nominator) and 

































population density (people per km2 of land area) 
 
trade openness (sum of imports and exports of 
goods and services as % of GDP) 
 
inflation, GDP deflator (annual %)  
 
total unemployment (as % of total labour force) 
 
value added of services (as % of GDP) 
 
value added of industry (as % of GDP) 
 
fixed broadband subscriptions (per 100 




World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators (WDI) 
dataset 
 


















































being a member of UEMOA (Union Economique 
et Monétaire Ouest Africaine) 
 
being a member of COMESA (Common Market 
for Eastern and Southern Africa) and/or CFTA 
Continental Free Trade Area) 
 
being a member of SADC (Southern African 
Development Community) 
 
being a member of APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation) 
 
being a member of UNASUR (Union of South 
American Nations) 
 
being a member of CACM (Central American 
Common Market) 
 
being a member of NAFTA (North American Free 
Trade Agreement)  
 
being a member of ASEAN ( Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations) 
 
being a member of MERCOSUR (Mercado 
Común del Sur) 
 
being a member of the EU (European Union) 
and/or of the Schengen area  
 
being a member of the OECD (Organisation for 






A.3.3 Cumulative FDI and the quality of institutions 
 
Dep var:ln_QGOV(a) (1) (2) (3) (4) 





   
 
 (0.007)    
ln_RFDI2006-2016  0.033***   
  (0.007)   
ln_CUMGRFDI2003-2009   0.063***  
   (0.013)  
ln_CUMGRFDI2010-2016    0.119*** 
    (0.012) 
ln_POP -0.069*** -0.777*** -0.098*** -0.152*** 
 (0.009) (0.013) (0. 015) (0.016) 
ln_DENS -0.011 -0.016* 0.005 0.01 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) 
ln_TRADE -0.039 -0.04 -0.03 -0.088** 
 (0.029) (0.036) (0.028) (0.036) 
ln_INFL -0.078 -0.103 -0.357* -0.08 
 (0.213) (0.274) (0.197) (0.172) 
ln_UNEMP -0.034* -0.028 -0.033** -0.017 
 (0.018) (0.020) (0.016) (0.015) 
ln_IND 0.071* 0.141*** 0.028 0.018 
 (0.028) (0.042) (0.038) (0.036) 
ln_SERV 0.253*** 0.392*** 0.344*** 0.19** 
 (0.078) (0.098) (0.090) (0.082) 
ln_BROADTEL 0.079*** 0.006 0.048** -0.003 
 (0.016) (0.02) (0.02) (0. 013) 
OECD 0.135*** 0.178*** 0.194*** 0.195*** 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.290) (0.03) 
Area dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 127 127 127 127 
Number of countries 127 127 127 127 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 5.838 564.107 37.73 4013.971 
J.Hansen p-value 0.724 0.182 0.042 0.071 
 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
a)CUMRFDI1995-2005 on QGOV in 2006, CUMRFDI2006-2016 on QGOV in 2016, GRFDI2003-2009 on QGOV in 2010,  
CUMGRFDI2010-2016  on QGOV in 2016. 
 
